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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Rainer Bauböck, Eva Ersbøll, Kees Groenendijk, Harald Waldrauch 
 
 
1  Nationality and citizenship in Europe: a common concern for all 
  Member States 
Nationality or citizenship has been called upon to be all things to all people: 
civil rights, political participation, social welfare, identity and recognition, the 
common good and the consciousness of community (Liebich 1995: 27). Formally, 
nationality is defined as the legal bond between a person and a state. It is a 
guiding principle of international law that it is for each state to determine un-
der its own law who are its nationals. However, with the development of human 
rights since the Second World War, the trend has been towards recognition of 
the right to a nationality as a human right and it has been accepted that, in 
matters of nationality, states shall also take individual interests into account. 
Nationality not only links an individual to a state, it also links individuals to in-
ternational law; in the EU it also provides individuals with a specific set of 
rights within this supranational Union. 
All fifteen EU Member States compared in this volume have experienced 
immigration as well as emigration and they face the same legitimate expecta-
tions from both immigrants and emigrants. However, their responses have been 
quite different. Some states have reacted to problems with immigrant integra-
tion by promoting naturalisation and by granting second and third generations 
of immigrant descent a right to their nationality, while others have made access 
to nationality more difficult for immigrants and their descendants. Some states 
have seen an interest in maintaining ties with their emigrants by allowing them 
to naturalise abroad without losing their nationality of origin, while others have 
refused to do so. 
The nationality policy of each individual state determines who becomes a 
Union citizen with corresponding rights in all Member States. This might call for 
common European standards with regard to nationality. Although international 
law has traditionally recognised the exclusive jurisdiction of individual states in 
nationality matters, the possibilities for adopting more uniform nationality rules 
have been discussed before (Rosenne 1972: 48). Thus, in 1924 the Internation-
al Law Association prepared a draft regarding the uniform regulation of ques-
tions of nationality. One suggestion was to embody the relevant clauses in na-
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tional legislation via a ‘model statute’, but the proposal was turned down by 
the experts preparing The Hague Codification Conference in 1930. The quest 
for uniformity was considered problematic in the absence of universal jurisdic-
tion and common jurisprudence, so that the different countries’ practical appli-
cation and interpretation of the law could not be expected to be identical. 
According to the EC Treaty, every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State is a citizen of the Union and, as such, has the right to move and 
reside freely within the Member States. The Court of Justice has held that it is 
not permissible for a Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the 
nationality of another Member State by imposing additional conditions for 
recognition of that nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms provided for in the EC.1 Thus, Member States with harsh naturalisation 
criteria are not entitled to withhold the benefits of fundamental freedoms under 
Community law from Union citizens who have naturalised on easier terms in 
other Member States. In the EU, regulating access to nationality in a Member 
State and thereby access to Union citizenship has, however, been fully de-
volved to Member States. This is surprising, compared to the quite different 
solution arrived at when a Nordic Union was discussed after the Second World 
War (Larsen 1944). As in the EU, the national identity of each Nordic state was 
seen as an obstacle to introducing a common Nordic nationality. It was there-
fore recommended that Nordic Union citizenship should complement rather than 
replace the nationality of a Member State. But, unlike in the EU, this led to a 
discussion of the consequences for the Member States’ regulations on acquisition 
and loss of nationality and it was concluded that significant differences be-
tween the Member States’ nationality legislation could not be maintained. For 
example, it would have been an odd situation if a foreigner born in Denmark 
could acquire Danish nationality at the age of nineteen and then move to 
Finland and enjoy equal rights there with native Finns in Nordic Union matters, 
while a foreigner born and raised in Finland would still be deprived of such 
rights. Since Nordic Union citizenship was meant to be attached to the national-
ity of each Member State, more uniform legislation on the acquisition and loss 
of nationality was found to be necessary. 
This conclusion has not been drawn in the European Union. Harmonisation of 
nationality laws clearly falls outside the competence of the Union. However, the 
institutions of the Union have recently recognised the need to exchange infor-
mation and to promote good practices in this area.2 In this book we provide the 
                                         
1  Case C-200/02 – Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ECR 2004, I-
3887. 
2  See the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council in October 1999 and 
the Communications by the Commission COM (2000) 757 and COM (2003) 336. 
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necessary background for this goal. We examine and compare in depth the 
nationality laws of the fifteen old Member States, we identify trends and areas 
of special concern and we make recommendations for minimum standards and 
highlight good practices. 
2  Terminology and research design 
This volume summarises the results of the EU-funded project, ‘The Acquisition of 
Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative Develop-
ments (NATAC)’. Due to its stringent methodology and terminology, the research 
design of this project differed considerably from other comparative studies of 
nationality policies.3 Frequently, such studies are mainly collections of country 
reports from which few, if any, comparative conclusions are drawn. In contrast, 
the ambition of this project was to be truly and more directly comparative by 
asking the same detailed and structured questions in all countries and by ap-
plying, as far as possible, the same terminology in this process. Below we give 
a short overview of the mainparts of this publication, the project on which it is 
based and the methodology applied. 
As a first step, a glossary of important terms in the area of acquisition and 
loss of nationality was drafted, which all project participants were urged to 
respect when writing their contributions for the project. Definitions concern dif-
ferent statuses (nationality, citizenship, special nationality status, multiple na-
tionality, etc.) as well as types (by birth, naturalisation, declaration, etc.) and 
modes of acquisition (e.g. ius sanguinis, residence-based or affinity based ac-
quisition, transfer or extension of acquisition) and loss of nationality (lapse, 
withdrawal, renunciation, etc.). Most importantly, we use the term ‘nationality’ in 
this context, rather than ‘citizenship’, to denote the legal relationship between a 
person and a state as recognised in international law. We are aware that citi-
zenship and nationality are often used synonymously and that some domestic 
laws use only the former concept. We are also aware of the ambiguities of 
‘nationality’ which, in some contexts, refers to national identity or membership 
of a national minority. Public international law, however, interprets the term 
‘nationality’ in the same sense as we do, i.e. as a legal relationship between 
individuals and states. The term ‘citizenship’, by contrast, is used for the sum of 
legal rights and duties of individuals attached to nationality under domestic 
law. The complete glossary can be found in the annex to this volume. 
As with most other projects, country reports were commissioned in which the 
history of nationality law and policy as well as the most important features of 
current nationality law and administrative practice in this area are described 
                                         
3  E.g. Nascimbene (1996), Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer (2000, 2001), Hansen & Weil (2001). 
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and analysed for each of the fifteen EU Member States before the latest round 
of accessions in May 2004. Project partners were given detailed guidelines 
concerning the required contents and structure of these reports. The country re-
ports provided important input for most of the other sections of the project de-
scribed below and they are published in Volume 2 of this publication. 
In order to be able to compare different ways of acquiring and losing na-
tionality more directly than would have been possible on the basis of a country 
report approach alone, typologies of 27 generally defined modes of acquisi-
tion and fifteen modes of loss were developed, which are outlined in Chapter 
2. All the national regulations concerning acquisition and loss of nationality in 
the fifteen countries compared were then classified on the basis of these typol-
ogies and short descriptions of the most important conditions and procedural 
aspects were produced for all national modes in force at the end of 2004 or 
at the beginning of 2005, as well as for all important modes in force at some 
point since 1985. Additionally, we selected modes of acquisition and loss for in 
depth-analysis that we regarded as specifically important because of their 
numerical, political or normative salience. These were then described on the 
basis of detailed questionnaires, which covered basic technical information (le-
gal basis, entry into force and expiry), procedural characteristics (type of pro-
cedure, responsible authorities, possibilities of appeal, etc.) and material condi-
tions (residence requirements, integrity clauses, conditions of integration, rea-
sons for loss of nationality, etc.) as well as major changes to procedural details 
and conditions since 1985. These descriptions were the main input for two ex-
tensive comparative reports on current rules as well as for the analysis of pat-
terns, developments and regime types with respect to the acquisition and loss 
of nationality. The short versions of these reports are contained in this volume 
as Chapters 3 and 4, whereas the long versions are included on the CD-ROM 
attached to this volume. This CD-ROM also contains the collected short descrip-
tions of all modes of acquisition and loss of nationality, as well as the complet-
ed questionnaires for the most important modes. We hope that this wealth of 
material will be useful for references purposes regarding specific countries or 
regulations, but also for further research and analysis by other scholars. 
The project team considered it very important not just to use laws, decrees 
and other legal texts as sources of information in the analysis, but also to take 
into account administrative practice in the area of the acquisition of nationality. 
However, due to the limited time and resources available, it was impossible to 
conduct interviews with public officials responsible for administering acquisition 
procedures or even with persons undergoing naturalisation themselves. We de-
cided therefore to ask NGOs providing counselling in this field about their ex-
periences. The project coordinators developed a questionnaire covering various 
aspects of acquisition procedures (acquisition requirements, multiple nationality, 
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fees, documents and other procedural aspects, preparatory courses and coun-
selling) and nationality policy in general (legal and political trends, incentives 
for the acquisition of nationality, unintended consequences of nationality policy, 
naturalisation campaigns), which the Brussels-based Migration Policy Group 
(MPG) used to conduct a survey among NGOs in the fifteen countries covered. 
The comparative report by the MPG on NGOs’ experiences, evaluations, rec-
ommendations and demands for policy change can be found in Chapter 5 of 
this volume. 
Certain transversal questions could not be answered exhaustively on the 
basis of the aforementioned country reports and questionnaires. These ques-
tions concern issues of gender equality, the rights of multiple nationals and ex-
patriates, and the statuses of three groups of persons – 1) denizens, 2) quasi-
citizens and 3) nationals whose rights are restricted because of the short time 
they have held nationality, the way they acquired nationality or because of 
their status as ‘special nationals’ (e.g. British Overseas Territories Citizenship in 
the United Kingdom). The rights of these groups are more extensive than those 
of newly immigrated foreign nationals, but still not on a par with those of 
‘regular’ nationals residing in the country and enjoying all the rights of citizen-
ship. To gather information on these issues, a separate ‘special questionnaire’ 
was developed, which was answered by each of the fifteen country corre-
spondents. Gender equality issues are analysed in Chapter 7, concerning 
trends in nationality law and practice and summarised in section 3.2 below, 
while the other questions are dealt with in three separate chapters. The com-
parative chapters on quasi-citizens (Chapter 9) and denizens (Chapter 10) 
shed additional light on the intricate distinctions between the status of nationals 
and non-nationals and the rules of transition between them. The same is true for 
nationals with restricted citizenship, whose rights and obligations are analysed 
in Chapter 8, together with those of expatriates and multiple nationals. 
Even though nationality law is one of the core areas of state sovereignty, 
public international law as well as European law nevertheless exert a certain 
influence on the nationality policies of EU Member States. The project, there-
fore, also included the drafting of a chapter on the legal frameworks of public 
international law and European law and their implications for the Member 
States’ nationality laws (Chapter 1). In this analysis, special emphasis was 
placed on the acquisition and loss of nationality, questions of multiple nationali-
ty, implications for the co-ordination of Member States’ nationality laws and 
the concept of European Union citizenship. Existing comparative studies either 
concentrate mainly on rules and/or administrative practices in the area of the 
acquisition of nationality, or they primarily analyse statistics concerning nation-
ality acquisitions. Studies of the first type thus mostly fail to make precise com-
parative statements about the quantitative importance of different modes of 
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nationality acquisition, while those of the second type are frequently unable to 
provide exact information concerning which modes of acquisition are actually 
covered by the statistics and which are not. The significance of comparisons is 
seriously called into question in both cases. By contrast, the NATAC project was 
intended to bring these two strands of research together for the first time and 
to include statistics on loss of nationality at the same time. The ultimate aim was 
a complete account of all acquisitions and losses of nationality at birth and af-
ter birth that would allow general statements about the emphasis states put on 
different, broader types of acquisition and loss of nationality. The main result 
of the analysis of the statistics in Chapter 6 is, unfortunately, that the availabil-
ity and quality of statistical data in this area leave a lot to be desired. In a 
few states, not even the most basic statistics on the acquisition of nationality are 
available, in most states, technical information on the actual content of statistics 
regarding the acquisition (and loss, if available at all) of nationality is very 
superficial and, in practically all states, certain modes of acquisition of nation-
ality (even those after birth) are not covered by the available statistics. 
Finally, all project sections described above were sources of information 
for two additional chapters that were drafted for this volume. On the one 
hand, Chapter 7 summarises the general trends in nationality law and practice 
in the EU15 states and thus complements the analysis of trends and develop-
ments with respect to specific modes of acquisition and loss of nationality in 
Chapters 3 and 4. On the other hand, in Chapter 11 we evaluate the policies 
described in the previous chapters and propose a number of detailed recom-
mendations with respect to various aspects of nationality policy on the basis of 
a small number of general guiding principles (see section 4 below). 
3  Main Trends 
3.1  Sources of convergence and divergence 
The comparative and country reports in this book demonstrate a bewildering 
complexity of rules and regulations for the acquisition and loss of nationality. 
There is no overall ‘European model’ of citizenship legislation, nor is it immedi-
ately possible to group several countries into internally coherent clusters with 
similar citizenship regimes. For a number of reasons, this is not entirely surpris-
ing. First, nationality laws, and citizenship policies more broadly, have been 
shaped by particular histories of state and nation building and European histo-
ry is probably more diverse in these respects than that of any other geograph-
ic region. Second, nationality law is still a policy domain within which the states 
in our sample have maintained almost unlimited national sovereignty. While 
emerging norms of international law, most importantly those codified in the 
1997 European Convention on Nationality, have had a clear impact in setting 
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minimum standards, political integration within the European Union has so far 
not been a major cause of convergence. Third, nationality laws tend to become 
more complex over time. Countries often start with fairly short laws that spell 
out fundamental principles for the initial determination of nationality after in-
dependence or regime change and for acquisition at birth, leaving naturalisa-
tion and loss of nationality within a broad area of discretion for the administra-
tive authorities. Where significant political pressure has built up from domestic 
pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant forces, as well as from expatriates, Europe-
an governments tend to respond by refining legal provisions and increasing the 
frequency of amendments. We can therefore discern a general trend towards 
more complex regulation which automatically increases the diversity of provi-
sions we find across our sample. 
Political scientists distinguish different sources of policy convergence across 
countries: enforcement, coordination, imitation and normative pressure. In the 
absence of Community competence in matters of nationality law, there is clear-
ly no enforcement and even less coordination initiated from above. We find, 
however, growing evidence for imitation across borders. Imitation occurs, first, 
at the level of governments observing how others (often of similar party com-
position) respond to problems regarding immigrant integration or populist anti-
immigrant pressure; second, within the judiciary, where lawyers and judges in-
creasingly borrow normative arguments that have been successful in deciding a 
controversy over nationality law in another country; and, third, within civil socie-
ty where NGOs and migrant organisations often spread or cooperate across 
borders (even if their influence on policy-making at state level is generally 
weak). 
While these forces are too weak to generate overall convergence, we still 
find specific trends with regard to certain modes of acquisition or loss of na-
tionality. These are extensively described in Chapters 3, 4 and 7 of this book. 
Here we will merely summarise the impact of international law and the most 
important tendencies we have found in domestic reforms in the fifteen countries 
we have examined. 
3.2  Trends in public international law and their impact 
Since the nineteenth century, states have cooperated on nationality issues. A 
number of bilateral conventions have been concluded between immigration and 
emigration countries, often with a view to solving problems relating to dual na-
tionality and military service. In the twentieth century, a number of general in-
ternational and regional conventions on nationality matters were concluded. 
The Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nation-
ality Laws (1930) was the first multilateral treaty concerning nationality law. 
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With the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the 
right of everyone to a nationality was recognised. 
Subsequently, international cooperation has focused especially on how to 
solve the problems of statelessness – de jure and de facto. The Conventions re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the Status of Stateless Persons 
(1954) prescribe that the contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate 
the naturalisation of refugees and stateless persons and the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (1961) bases the right to a nationality for persons 
who would otherwise be stateless on ties with the state in which they were born 
or in which a parent held nationality at the time of their birth. 
Later, the rights of married women and children to a nationality were 
brought into focus by conventions including the Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women (1957), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966), the European Convention on the Adoption of Children (1967), the Con-
vention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Other international instruments 
dealing with the right to a nationality include the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) and the European Convention on 
the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cas-
es of Multiple Nationality (1963). A number of general principles were reflect-
ed in these conventions: the individual right to a nationality, the avoidance of 
statelessness and multiple nationality, the unity of family, the elimination of dis-
crimination (especially gender discrimination), and the principle that the attribu-
tion of nationality to a person should be based on a genuine link with the state 
whose nationality is acquired. Over the years, legal developments have 
changed the relative weight of these principles, which is especially true for the 
avoidance of multiple nationality, which has given way to widespread toler-
ance. Therefore, the Council of Europe considered it necessary to adopt a new 
comprehensive convention with modern solutions to issues relating to nationality, 
suitable for all European states and, in 1997, the European Convention on Na-
tionality (ECN) was adopted. 
The ECN is considered one of the most important conventions of the Council 
of Europe. It has further developed the right to a given nationality and has al-
ready had a considerable impact on the nationality laws of the states in our 
sample. Among the fifteen states, only five have not signed or ratified the ECN 
(Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK). Thus, ten states shall refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object or purpose of the Convention and 
among these states, six have until now given their consent to be bound by rati-
fication (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden). 
As will be clear from Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7, the Convention’s influence in terms 
of relaxing the requirements for the acquisition of nationality is clear in matters 
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of tolerance of multiple nationality, avoiding statelessness and gender equality 
with respect to the transfer of nationality to children. In terms of restrictive 
measures, it might be assumed that the ECN has been an incentive for recent 
amendments leading to a withdrawal of nationality in cases of fraud or con-
duct prejudicial to the vital interests of the state, but it seems more likely that 
the Convention has prevented more far reaching changes concerning the with-
drawal of nationality, advocated by certain political parties. 
3.3  Trends in domestic legislation 
Chapter 7 on trends in nationality law describes and analyses recent develop-
ments in nationality law and policy in the fifteen old Member States. In addi-
tion, Chapters 3 and 4 provide further insights into trends with respect to cer-
tain modes of acquisition and loss of nationality, especially over the past dec-
ade. The most important finding is a new trend in many Member States since 
2000 towards more restrictive naturalisation policies (especially in Denmark, 
France, Greece, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and in Austria). However, 
countertrends were also observed in other states (Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and, most likely, in Portugal in the near future). 
In the literature on nationality law, the assumption is of convergence to-
wards more liberal naturalisation policies, with the aim of including large 
groups of permanently resident immigrants. Naturalisation has been perceived 
and used as an instrument supporting the integration of immigrants. Thus, the 
acquisition of nationality by second generation immigrants was facilitated, the 
requirements for naturalisation by first generation immigrants were reduced 
and multiple nationality was accepted. On these three issues, we observed re-
cent developments in the opposite direction. Although almost all countries in our 
research have shown tendencies to facilitate the acquisition of nationality by 
second generation immigrants, this trend has been followed by a counter-
tendency towards restricting the rights of the second generation. Access to nat-
uralisation by first generation immigrants has become more difficult in several 
countries with the introduction of stricter language and integration require-
ments. There has been an even broader trend since the early 1990s to make 
acquisition for the spouses of nationals or the extension of naturalisation to 
spouses more difficult by lengthening residence and marriage duration re-
quirements and by removing exemptions from other naturalisation require-
ments. The purpose of this seems to be to reduce the incidence of marriages of 
convenience. Finally, and contrary to the restrictive tendencies in other areas, 
multiple nationality has been accepted in most countries. Only five of the fif-
teen Member States still require renunciation upon naturalisation: Sweden and 
Finland abolished the ban on multiple nationality in the past five years, and 
Luxembourg is discussing doing so in 2006. 
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The convergence hypothesis also cannot account for two country-specific 
phenomena. One is that Southern European countries (particularly Greece and 
Italy), although faced with large scale immigration, have generally adopted 
highly restrictive attitudes towards naturalisation. However, Spain has experi-
enced a considerable increase in the number of naturalisations over the past 
five years and the Portuguese government has recently proposed a new na-
tionality law that would substantially liberalise naturalisation. The second phe-
nomenon is that, since about 2000, several Western and Northern European 
countries have partly reversed their previous liberal policies. The concept of 
‘naturalisation as a means of integration’ is apparently being replaced by an-
other paradigm of naturalisation as the ‘crowning of a completed integration 
process’. The implications of this policy shift are evident, for example, in the 
introduction of formal examinations of language skills and knowledge of socie-
ty. Tests of knowledge about the country in naturalisation procedures were in-
troduced in Denmark in 2002, in France and the Netherlands in 2003, in 
Greece in 2004 and in the United Kingdom in 2005 and their introduction is 
currently (end of 2005) on the political agenda in Austria and Luxembourg. As 
of November 2005, a bill is pending in the Dutch parliament that would even 
introduce mandatory language tests for persons who have already acquired 
Dutch nationality by naturalisation or by birth in the Netherlands Antilles. How-
ever, several countries deviate from this trend towards more restrictive policies. 
The most obvious case in this respect is Belgium. It not only abolished the in-
tegration requirement for naturalisation and reduced the required residence 
period in 2000, but also introduced a new right to acquire nationality by sim-
ple declaration after seven years of residence. This change resulted in a sub-
stantial increase in acquisitions of nationality. However, the fear that naturali-
sation has become too easy has surfaced in this country as well. Other states 
that have considerably liberalised the rules for naturalisation since the begin-
ning of the millennium are Germany (especially in reducing the required resi-
dence period from fifteen to eight years and in clearer conditions), Finland and 
Sweden (acceptance of multiple nationality) and Luxembourg (reduction of the 
required residence period from ten to five years, acceptance of multiple na-
tionality is currently being discussed). As mentioned above, Portugal is likely to 
join this group in 2006. 
3.3.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF NATURALISATION POLICIES  
Opportunities to acquire a country’s nationality are determined not only by the 
formal conditions laid down in nationality laws, but also by their practical im-
plementation and more general public policies of welcoming or deterring new 
citizens. Long procedures, broad discretion, regional differences in implementa-
tion and the lack of effective rights of appeal are hardly less relevant as ob-
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stacles to naturalisation than formal requirements. Several Member States have 
made efforts to reduce the duration of naturalisation procedures, e.g. by intro-
ducing legal maximum durations or by decentralising the procedure. Only in 
three countries (the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany) is the discretion of 
authorities responsible for deciding on applications for ordinary naturalisation 
severely limited. In addition, in Belgium the authorities’ room for discretion in 
procedures involving the acquisition of nationality by declaration after seven 
years of residence is also strongly curtailed. In the other countries, applicants 
are either entitled to acquire nationality, but the conditions they have to meet 
leave much room for interpretation by the authorities (Spain), or the competent 
authorities have the power to deny applications, even if all the statutory re-
quirements have been met (all other states). Reducing administrative discretion, 
however, may also lead to more restrictive policies, as demonstrated by the 
introduction of formal language and integration examinations in the Nether-
lands and Denmark. Empirical information on the implementation of naturalisa-
tion policies may provide a very different and more accurate picture of access 
to nationality, of the actual effects of naturalisation policies and of those coun-
tries operating a liberal or restrictive policy. We suggest that more empirical 
research on the implementation of naturalisation policies is needed. In our book, 
analyses of implementation are based on assessments by academic experts 
and NGOs that provide counselling immigrants. Future research should also 
involve interviews with civil servants and studies accompanying immigrants 
through the application process (see Wunderlich 2005). 
Chapter 7 also discusses two subjects that receive less attention in most of 
the literature on citizenship and nationality law: gender discrimination and the 
position of emigrants. 
3.3.2  GENDER 
In general, gender inequality in nationality law is considered a thing of the 
past. However, our findings show that gender is still a topical issue in most 
countries, resulting in legislative activity in recent years. This activity relates 
mainly to the nationality of children. All fifteen countries have now gender-
neutral ius sanguinis from both the father’s and the mother’s side. However, 
past gender discrimination in this respect has not been corrected consistently. 
Only Luxembourg introduced a fully retroactive option for nationality for these 
children in 1986, whereas in Austria and the Netherlands they could only make 
their claims within a transitional period. 
The opposite kind of gender discrimination still persists in various forms for 
children born out of wedlock. In six of the countries covered by our study they 
do not automatically acquire their father’s nationality at birth, even if the pa-
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ternity has been established. Combating ‘bogus recognitions’ seems to be a 
concern that overrides gender equality in these cases. 
3.3.3  EMIGRANTS 
Most literature on nationality law focuses on naturalisation policies concerning 
immigrants and neglects the facilitated acquisition or reacquisition of nationali-
ty by nationals abroad. However, many of the liberalising legislative activities 
in recent years in Southern and Northern European countries have actually fo-
cused on emigrants more than on immigrants. In some countries (especially in 
Sweden and Finland), tolerance of multiple nationality in naturalisations came 
about as a response to demands from expatriates. Developments since 2000 
could be qualified as a process of ‘re-ethnicisation’. With regard to emigrants, 
policies have generally become more liberal, whereas the inclination of Mem-
ber States to be inclusive to immigrants living on their territory has declined. 
The former tendency is also evident in a growing number of states that grant 
their emigrants voting rights in general elections (see section 8.4.1). It is still 
uncertain whether the restrictive trend towards immigrants will result in conver-
gence and whether it will be a lasting trend. Another question is whether the 
ECN and the institution of Union citizenship will impose limits on this trend. 
3.3.4  AFFINITY-BASED ACQUISITION OF NATIONALITY 
Facilitating the reacquisition of nationality by former nationals is one element 
of the broader policies of promoting the acquisition of nationality by persons 
with an ethnic and/or cultural affinity to the country. Other groups of persons 
targeted by such affinity-based granting of nationality are descendants of 
former nationals, nationals of certain co-lingual or otherwise culturally related 
foreign states, ethnic diasporas in particular regions of the world and persons 
with the same ethno-cultural background as the majority population of the 
country in question. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, the EU15 Member States can 
be grouped into three clusters in this respect. The first cluster is made up of Aus-
tria, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which all facili-
tate the reacquisition of nationality to a certain degree as well as the acquisi-
tion of nationality by nationals of certain foreign states in some cases, but do 
not make special rules for persons simply on the basis of their ethnocultural 
background. Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and Luxembourg go further, in 
that they also facilitate the acquisition of nationality by persons with a certain 
ethnic or cultural background or descendants of former nationals, but usually 
only once they have (again) taken up residence in the country. Due to its policy 
of very smooth nationality acquisition by former nationals and their descend-
ants residing abroad throughout much of the 1990s, Italy has a lot in common 
with the third cluster of states, which comprises Germany, Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain. The main shared feature of these states is that they all have 
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policies for granting nationality to ethnic diasporas or descendants of former 
nationals, even if these persons reside abroad. In addition, Germany and 
Greece also aim to ‘repatriate’ ethnic diasporas from the former Soviet Union, 
but in the late 1990s and early 2000s both states tightened the initially very 
liberal rules for the acquisition of nationality for such ethnic ‘repatriates’ to 
some degree. By contrast, Spain eased the conditions for descendants of for-
mer nationals (irrespective of where they reside) and both Spain and Portugal 
have recently liberalised their rules for reacquisition by former nationals resid-
ing abroad. 
3.3.5 LOSS OF NATIONALITY 
Chapter 4 describes modes of loss of nationality and highlights a number of 
trends in this area. Two of the reasons for a loss of nationality have clearly 
become less commonplace in recent years. The first is the acquisition of a for-
eign nationality, which may now lead to the loss of nationality under certain 
circumstances in eleven states. Sweden and Finland abolished the correspond-
ing provision within the past five years and Austria, the Netherlands and Spain 
have introduced extended possibilities for retention of nationality for certain 
groups of nationals in cases where naturalisation takes place abroad. The main 
counter-example is Germany which, in 2000, abolished the rule that nationality 
is not lost if a foreign nationality is acquired, but residence in Germany is main-
tained. This change has dramatic effects for tens of thousands of Germans of 
Turkish origin who reacquired Turkish nationality after naturalisation in Germa-
ny. The second reason for loss of nationality that has occurred less frequently in 
recent years is serious criminal offences: the corresponding provisions have 
been abolished in France (1998) and the United Kingdom (2002). 
On the other hand, laws have been toughened regarding a number of 
rules for the loss of nationality. Most importantly, this concerns the withdrawal 
of nationality because it was acquired by fraudulent means. Such rules have 
been introduced in the laws of Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands since 
2002 and, in Belgium, new or tighter rules are currently on the political agen-
da. Secondly, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, some states also facili-
tated the loss of nationality when crimes against the state, including terrorism, 
have been committed. The United Kingdom, Denmark and the Dutch govern-
ment have tightened existing rules or introduced new ones since 2002, or are 
currently planning such provisions. The only counter-example is Spain, where 
crimes against the external security of the state ceased to be reasons for the 
withdrawal of nationality in 2002. 
Finally, extended residence abroad as a reason for the loss of nationality 
does not receive much public or academic attention, even though it exists in 
some form or another in nine of the EU15 states. Such provisions should be of 
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special interest to the EU since they may have the effect of depriving Union 
citizens of their status because they make use of their rights of free movement 
(see also section 4.2 below). The past few years have seen considerable legis-
lative activity in this area, but there is no clear trend. Spain introduced its pro-
visions only in 1990 and 2002, and Ireland (2001), Finland and the Nether-
lands (both 2003) extended the groups of persons affected by their regula-
tions. With the exception of Ireland, however, all these states also made it eas-
ier to take action to avoid this loss. In addition, Denmark (1999) and Sweden 
(2001) limited the applicability of their rules to persons who also hold a for-
eign nationality. Most importantly, though, in 1998 Greece abolished the heav-
ily-criticised rule that nationals who are not of Greek orthodox descent could 
be deprived of their nationality, even if this made them stateless, once they 
abandoned Greek territory ‘with no intention of returning’. 
3.3.6 QUASI-CITIZENS, DENIZENS AND NATIONALS WITH RESTRICTED  
CITIZENSHIP 
In Chapters 9 and 10 we discuss the status of two categories of immigrants 
closely related to nationality. Both statuses relate to non-citizens who are treat-
ed almost as citizens, but for some reason do not enjoy full citizenship of the 
country of residence: quasi-citizens and denizens. The term denizen describes 
the status of a person approximately halfway between a citizen and a non-
citizen. It is often used for immigrants who are granted free access to the la-
bour market, the same rights as nationals to social security, a form of protection 
against sudden expulsion from the country and, sometimes, some political rights 
as well. Quasi-citizenship is defined as a status of enhanced denizenship that 
entails almost identical rights as those enjoyed by resident nationals, including 
voting rights at some level (local or national) or access to public office, as well 
as full protection from expulsion. 
From the survey in Chapter 9, it appears that the legislation of six old 
Member States (Denmark, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the 
UK) provides for one or more forms of quasi-citizenship. Status is related to the 
process of decolonisation or to the integration of immigrants, or it is granted to 
descendants of emigrants who left the country many generations previously. It 
is a transitional status often governed by rules closely related to those of na-
tionality law. In countries that do not grant ius soli nationality to the children of 
immigrants at birth, the status of quasi-citizenship provides equal treatment 
during childhood and paves the way for the acquisition of nationality upon 
reaching the age of majority. In most Member States, the rights attached to 
permanent residence status granted under national law remained unchanged 
after 2000. However, the general tendency in recent years has been to make 
it more difficult to acquire and more easy to lose this status. So far, the adop-
tion of Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of long-term resident third country 
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nationals appears to have had the ‘perverse’ effect of making access to 
denizenship status more difficult, with the introduction of a language and inte-
gration requirement or of longer residence requirements, as in France and the 
Netherlands. The UK, where the directive does not apply, has also adopted 
such conditions. Facilitation of access to this status occurred only in Spain. In 
Member States where this status has been easily accessible, once the residence 
requirement was met, very large numbers of non-nationals acquired this status. 
This is a clear indication that immigrants value access to denizenship, even if 
some of them might not yet consider naturalisation an attractive next step. 
Alongside the growing numbers of non-nationals with nearly full citizenship, 
there are still several groups of nationals who do not enjoy full citizenship. In 
Chapter 8 we analyse such restrictions, including those affecting British nation-
als from overseas territories who are subject to immigration control, Danish na-
tionals who must have held their nationality for 28 years in order to enjoy full 
rights to family reunification and a pending bill in the Dutch parliament that 
would impose integration tests on large numbers of naturalised citizens. 
4  Main recommendations 
4.1  General principles 
The concluding chapter of Volume 1 contains our evaluation of laws and poli-
cies in matters of nationality and recommendations directed towards Member 
State governments and the European Union. These are grounded in four basic 
principles, the first of which is democratic inclusion. Long-term immigrants and 
their descendants should have access to nationality in order to promote their 
overall integration into society and to reduce the deficit of representation in 
democracies where the right to vote in national elections is tied to nationality, 
but where large numbers of the resident population remain excluded because 
of their foreign nationality. 
Secondly, we propose a principle of stakeholding that recognises that ex-
patriates, as well as their countries of origin, have a legitimate interest in re-
taining legal and political ties across international borders. While first genera-
tion emigrants must be free to renounce their nationality, they should not be 
deprived of it against their will. States should recognise that most migrants are 
stakeholders in two different countries. Dual nationality should therefore be 
tolerated not merely when it begins at birth, but also through naturalisation. 
The principle of stakeholding does, however, restrict access to a nationality 
without any genuine link and leads to a recommendation that ius sanguinis ac-
quisition of citizenship should generally expire with the third generation, i.e. for 
children born abroad, both of whose parents were also born abroad. 
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Thirdly, nationality laws should fully take into account human rights norms 
enshrined in the international conventions discussed in section 3.2 above. These 
entail facilitated access to nationality for refugees and stateless persons, as 
well as the principles of nondiscrimination, including between men and women, 
between persons who have acquired nationality at birth or through naturalisa-
tion and between particular nationalities of origin. Finally, human rights princi-
ples also require that the rule of law and principles of due process be fully 
applied to naturalisation and loss of nationality. 
Fourthly, states should adopt laws and policies that can be generalised 
and do not jeopardise friendly international relations. This would require states 
not to adopt policies towards their expatriates that they are not willing to ac-
cept as sending state policies towards foreign nationals on their own territory. 
The power of states to determine their own nationals must also be constrained 
when it subverts the legitimate interests of other states, which may be the case 
when a Member State of the European Union creates large numbers of new 
nationals abroad who then enjoy the right to enter any other Member State of 
the Union. 
4.2  Taking Union citizenship into account 
The fact that Union citizenship is derived from Member State nationality and 
cannot be directly accessed intensifies the responsibility of Member States to 
take the European effects of their nationality laws into account. The lack of co-
ordination between Member States in this matter creates three types of prob-
lem for the Union: first, the problem of fairness if conditions for access to the 
rights of Union citizens are very imbalanced among the Member States; sec-
ondly, the problem of the adverse impact of actions by one Member State on 
all others; and, thirdly, the negative consequences of geographic mobility with-
in the Union for acquisition and loss of nationality. 
While the first two problems can be addressed through the general princi-
ples outlined so far, the third problem calls for specific action in the European 
arena. Exercising one’s right of free movement under Community law should not 
imply disadvantages concerning the acquisition and loss of nationality in a 
Member State. Currently, this is the case when nationality is lost after a longer 
period of residence abroad. States with such provisions in their laws should ei-
ther abolish them altogether or adopt the recent Dutch reform that residence in 
another Member State does not lead to a loss of nationality. A similar argu-
ment applies to residence conditions for the acquisition of nationality. Union 
citizens or long-term resident third country nationals will be at a disadvantage 
with regard to access to nationality in another Member State if they have used 
their mobility rights under Community law extensively and cannot meet a resi-
dence requirement for naturalisation in that state. This problem can be greatly 
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alleviated by generally reducing residence requirements for naturalisation. 
However, we make an additional recommendation that residence periods spent 
in another Member State should be taken into account, even if they are less 
important or if a minimum time has to be spent in the country where nationality 
is being acquired. Although all Member States face similar challenges to adapt 
their policies on nationality and citizenship to large-scale migration and Euro-
pean integration, variations between nationality laws partly reflect specific 
circumstances, such as immigration from former colonies or the existence of a 
large co-ethnic diaspora. We therefore do not suggest that the Union should 
strive for legal competence in matters of nationality that would enable it to 
harmonise legislation among Member States. Instead, we propose applying the 
open method of coordination in order to encourage mutual learning from good 
practices and convergence towards minimum standards, grounded in the princi-
ples suggested above. For this process, a better knowledge of the facts will be 
essential. As discussed in Chapter 6, many Member States do not even collect 
or publish essential statistical data that would allow a comparison of the exact 
rates of acquisition and loss of nationality among different migrant populations 
and different countries. Current attempts to harmonise statistical data on mi-
gration should include a requirement that all Member States must provide reli-
able, comparable and sufficiently differentiated data on all modes of acquisi-
tion and loss of nationality. 
4.3  Main recommendations for acquisition and loss of nationality 
Our recommendations are based on a generational approach. Access to na-
tionality should be automatic for the third generation whose parents were born 
in that country, entitlements to optional acquisition should be granted to the 
second generation and the ‘generation 1.5’ – those who were born abroad but 
raised in the country in question. For first generation immigrants, naturalisation 
requirements should be clearly defined and implemented in ways that enable 
and encourage them to acquire the nationality of their country of long-term 
residence. We identify good practices along these lines in states that require a 
legal residence of no more than five years, do not require the renunciation of a 
previous nationality and do not exclude immigrants below a certain income 
threshold. The recent trend towards more extensive ‘integration tests’ should be 
evaluated by asking whether these provide positive incentives for immigrants 
or serve rather to exclude larger numbers from naturalisation. Expecting appli-
cants for naturalisation to acquire basic language skills can promote their socio-
economic integration and enable new citizens to participate in public political 
life. Written tests on language and knowledge of society, history and the con-
stitution, however, do not provide sufficient flexibility in judging relevant skills 
and deter many poorly skilled or elderly immigrants. On the other hand, vague 
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criteria such as good character, level of integration or assimilation often give 
too much scope to arbitrary decisions or the discriminatory treatment of mi-
grants of different origins. 
Four categories of persons enjoy facilitated access to naturalisation in 
many countries. These are 1) refugees and stateless persons, 2) the spouses 
and minor children of nationals and of immigrants who are applying for natu-
ralisation, 3) immigrants with historic ties or cultural affinity to the country of 
immigration and, 4) citizens of other EU Member States. We strongly advocate 
easier access to nationality for groups one and two because their claims are 
based on individual needs for protection through new citizenship or for family 
unity in matters of nationality. Facilitated naturalisation based on ascriptive 
grounds of national or ethnic origin may be justified in specific contexts, but will 
often become problematic over time when immigration by people of many dif-
ferent origins increases, since easier access for some nationals will then be ex-
perienced as discriminatory by other immigrants with longer periods of previ-
ous residence. 
Emigrants, although they will not be able to enjoy most of the citizenship 
rights of nationals residing in their country of nationality, still have a general 
claim to retention of that nationality. When they acquire the nationality of their 
country of residence, they must be free to renounce their previous nationality, 
but we suggest that they should not be forced to do so. Our recommendation 
for tolerating dual nationality among migrants who are stakeholders in two 
countries applies to immigrants as well as to emigrants. Several states in our 
sample also make specific provisions for the reacquisition of nationality by em-
igrants who have lost it under prior legislation, especially through marriage or 
because of a former renunciation requirement. We generally support these 
provisions but criticise the fact that some countries allow reacquisition only if the 
nationality was acquired by birth rather than through naturalisation. 
Our final set of recommendations concerns the institutional arrangements 
and procedures for naturalisation. Even where the law itself does not create 
difficult hurdles, access to nationality may be blocked by administrative prac-
tices and implementation procedures. We recommend that applicants for natu-
ralisation should not be burdened by high fees and excessive demands for of-
ficial documents. There should be a maximum period within which applications 
have to be decided. Civil servants dealing with naturalisation should be trained 
and supervised, negative decisions should always have to be justified in writing 
and applicants should have the opportunity to complain and the right of ap-
peal. Public administrations ought to provide assistance and cooperate with 
migrant organisations in helping immigrants prepare their applications and 
meet language requirements. In countries where the implementation of national-
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ity laws is delegated to regional or local authorities, it is important to ensure 
uniform standards in applying the law. 
Democratic countries of immigration should not only grant immigrants the 
opportunity to acquire nationality, but they also have a vital interest in encour-
aging them to do so. Common citizenship provides a reference point for soli-
darity in societies made up of people of diverse origins. Public campaigns 
promoting naturalisation and public nationality award ceremonies can be use-
ful instruments. Such campaigns have been rare in Europe; not only would they 
raise the numbers of applications, they would also contribute to a more positive 
perception of immigrants as new citizens within the general population. 
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EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Rainer Bauböck & Bernhard Perchinig 
1 Introduction 
In this book we have documented the diversity of legal regulations and policies 
concerning the acquisition and loss of nationality in the fifteen old Member 
States of the EU. We also asked whether any trends towards greater similarity 
are emerging from international and European law or from parallel domestic 
developments in the Member States. The final chapter evaluates the policies 
and practices analysed in this book and makes specific recommendations 
aimed at legislators, executives and EU institutions. The task we set ourselves 
does not include an overall evaluation of each country’s citizenship regime. We 
therefore do not provide a ranking of countries with regard to how restrictive 
or how inclusive their citizenship regimes are. This task has been partly accom-
plished by earlier reports (Waldrauch 2001; British Council 2005). Rather than 
attempting to construct citizenship indices, our goal is to provide constructive 
guidelines for reforming specific elements of policies and legislation in this ar-
ea. We also do not base our evaluations and recommendations on a single 
overarching norm such as maximising inclusion, but try to take into account sev-
eral, sometimes conflicting, interests and principles. We do not confine our-
selves to questions of compliance with positive international or domestic law, 
but will refer more broadly to principles of democracy, social and political in-
clusion, friendly international relations and others that are widely shared but 
not always consistently applied to matters of nationality. Most importantly, our 
evaluations and recommendations are not derived from an underlying goal of 
promoting convergence among nationality law across all Member States. We 
will discuss in section 2 why we still think that European integration has im-
portant implications for national policies in this area. However, we do not ad-
vocate either a uniform regime for acquisition or loss of nationality in all Mem-
ber States or a transfer of sovereignty in this matter from the Member States 
to European institutions. Such goals might eventually become feasible and de-
sirable at a different stage of the European integration process but they are 
currently highly controversial and we do not think that affirming them is neces-
sary for arguing the policy reforms that we advocate under current conditions. 
Our report will instead try to do two things: on the one hand, we will advo-
cate normative minimum standards that each country should adopt and, on the 
other hand, we will identify what we regard as good practices, i.e. policies or 
legal provisions that effectively resolve a particular problem or meet a norma-
tive target and which could provide examples for cross-national policy learning 
and imitation. Between minimum standards and best practices, much room for 
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legitimate variation exists. Such variations in nationality policies are also often 
necessary in order to respond flexibly to particular circumstances. For example, 
a country that has many immigrants from former colonies may have good rea-
sons to adopt rules for preferential naturalisation that would be regarded as 
discriminatory in the context of another state. 
The final caveat is that our evaluations and recommendations do not cover 
the full range of issues in nationality law and citizenship policies. Firstly, we 
focus here on those concerns that are widely shared among the countries cov-
ered in our study. For this reason, we do not address here issues of state suc-
cession4 or of citizenship relations with co-ethnic minorities in neighbouring 
states, both of which are of great importance for the ten new Member States, 
but much less so for the fifteen old ones. Secondly, we focus on rules for the 
acquisition and loss of the status of nationality rather than on the citizenship 
rights and obligations attached to it.5 Thirdly, our evaluations and recommen-
dations will be selective, according to the same criteria that we applied in 
Chapter 2 for selecting modes of acquisition and loss for detailed analysis, i.e., 
statistical, political and normative salience. This report therefore focuses on 
provisions in nationality law that affect large numbers of persons, that have 
been at the centre of political debates in several countries and that concern the 
more fundamental interests and claims to rights of both individuals and states.6 
The principles for evaluation and general recommendations proposed in this 
report are not entirely novel. They overlap with some earlier reports (Aleinikoff 
& Klusmeyer 2002; Bauböck 2005; British Council 2005; de Groot 2003; 
Groenendijk, Guild & Barzilay 2001). The specific achievement of our study is 
that never before have these ideas been grounded in or applied to such a 
comprehensive and systematic international comparison of European nationality 
laws and policies. 
2 General principles for acquisition and loss of nationality 
A number of principles have traditionally been applied to nationality law in 
domestic legislation and international law. Among these are the principle that 
every person should have a nationality, with its corollary that statelessness 
should be avoided; the principle of equality, which has been applied specifi-
cally to eliminate gender discrimination; the principle of avoiding multiple na-
                                         
4  International law norms concerning nationality in cases of state succession are, however, 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
5  The rights and obligations of nationals, quasi-citizens and denizens are discussed to a 
certain extent in Chapters 1, 8, 9 and 10. 
6  Evaluations and recommendations on other issues can be found in many of the other 
chapters in this volume as well as in the country reports, published separately in volume 
2. 
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tionality, which has been abandoned by a growing number of states; the fami-
ly unity principle, which has been partly superseded by gender equality but 
could still be sustained where multiple nationality is tolerated; and the principle 
of a genuine link to the respective country as a condition for the attribution of 
nationality by a state. The interpretation and weight of these principles has 
changed over time and they partly conflict with one another. They must there-
fore be specified and balanced against one another. We will take them into 
account but will structure our discussion slightly differently. We suggest that 
normative standards in nationality law and policies can be derived from rec-
ognising the following fundamental interests and concerns of individuals and 
states: (1) enhancing democratic inclusion through the political integration of 
immigrants and their children; (2) encouraging ties between emigrants and 
source countries; (3) promoting human rights and the rule of law in matters of 
nationality; and (4) ensuring mutual compatibility between national policies. 
2.1  Democratic inclusion of immigrants 
All fifteen of the states in our sample have been the targets of substantial im-
migration that has fundamentally changed the composition of the general pop-
ulation. Apart from the more recent immigration in countries in the Mediterra-
nean region, large cohorts of second and third generations of immigrant de-
scent are present in all the Member States that have experienced immigration 
in recent decades. States that make access to naturalisation difficult and do not 
provide for elements of ius soli are generating growing percentages of foreign 
nationals among their permanent resident population. This must be regarded as 
problematic from two perspectives. 
Firstly, blocked access to nationality often reinforces social and economic 
integration deficits. With effect from January 2006, the EU directive on long-
term resident third country nationals (2003/109 EC) will ensure a certain level 
of free movement, access to employment and to social welfare benefits for this 
group, but they still face various disadvantages, relating to security of resi-
dence or political rights, compared to nationals of the country of residence. 
Research in several immigration countries shows that naturalised immigrants 
tend to be more upwardly mobile than foreign nationals in the same immigra-
tion cohort (Rallu 2004; De Voretz & Pivnenko 2004). This is partly due to self-
selection (upwardly mobile migrants tend to naturalise more often), but also to 
other factors such as employers’ preferences for naturalised immigrants. 
Secondly, democratic legitimacy may be undermined by a large and 
growing discrepancy between the general resident population subjected to the 
laws of the land and the citizens who are represented in the making of these 
laws. This is less problematic if the cause of such discrepancy is reluctance by 
foreign nationals to adopt the nationality of their host country. Persistently low 
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naturalisation rates among foreign nationals eligible for naturalisation may be 
regrettable for the same reasons as low voter participation rates, but they 
cannot be taken as an indication of a structural democratic deficit, especially if 
those who qualify do not apply because they already enjoy most of the rights 
attached to national citizenship, as is generally the case for EU citizens living in 
other Member States. Our evaluation must be different when access to nation-
ality is blocked by conditions that are difficult to meet. The status of permanent 
resident foreign nationals then becomes almost like that of women, unproper-
tied citizens or disenfranchised racial and indigenous groups before the intro-
duction of universal suffrage. The fact that foreign nationals have another state 
that is responsible for taking them back does not compensate for their exclusion 
from democratic representation in their country of permanent residence. Along 
with most contemporary theorists of democracy who have addressed the prob-
lem (e.g. Walzer 1983; Carens 1989; Dahl 1989; Habermas 1990), we there-
fore support the right to naturalisation for long-term foreign nationals under 
conditions that should be sufficiently clear and easy to meet for ordinary immi-
grants. Since democratic states should also be interested in promoting naturali-
sation, we further advocate outreach policies and public campaigns encourag-
ing immigrants who meet the conditions to apply. 
The claims of second and third generations of immigrant descent to the na-
tionality of their country of birth or socialisation are considerably stronger than 
those derived from long-term residence. For these children, a foreign nationali-
ty acquired by descent no longer indicates a link to another country of origin 
and the rights attached to this external nationality will be much less relevant 
than for first generation immigrants. Going beyond the provision of the Euro-
pean Convention of Nationality that foresees facilitated naturalisation for these 
groups (ECN 1997, Art. 6(4)), we recommend that, for children born and raised 
in the country in question, an unconditional option of acquisition of nationality 
iure soli should be offered at birth or until the age of 23.7 We do not, however, 
suggest a uniform policy of automatic acquisition at birth in the territory for all 
groups.8 A combination of optional ius soli for children with a parent who is a 
legal resident and of automatic ‘double ius soli’ for the third generation will 
generally be sufficiently inclusive. 
In other respects, however, ius soli itself is not sufficiently inclusive in immi-
gration contexts where many children arrive at an early age in the process of 
                                         
7  Identity formation is not necessarily completed by the age of majority, so we suggest 
that young adults should still be given some time to decide after reaching this age. 
8  Strict ius soli in the U.S. is a historic by-product of the abolition of slavery and was origi-
nally not related to immigration. In the United Kingdom before 1981 and in the Irish Re-
public before 2005 strict ius soli was not a response to immigration either. 
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family reunification. From the perspective of the state, ius soli provides a simple 
solution that is easy to administer. 
From the perspective of individual attachments, however, the mere fact of 
birth in a country is more accidental than residence during childhood. Nationali-
ty policies should therefore adopt a generational approach and provide ac-
cess to nationality not merely based on birth in the territory, but alternatively 
also based on socialisation, i.e. the years spent there during early childhood 
and compulsory schooling (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer 2003: 20-21). 
2.2  Maintaining ties with expatriates 
International migration is an activity that creates legal and political relations 
between individuals and two or more states. Migrants have therefore relevant 
interests not only regarding receiving states, but also regarding countries of 
origin. The latter are not always interested in active involvement and citizen-
ship. Sometimes the primary claim migrants have towards their state of origin is 
to be released from its nationality. This is especially true for refugees who are 
outside their state of nationality and do not enjoy protection by that state, but 
it may also apply to other migrants for whom emigration is primarily an exit 
option from undesirable economic or political conditions and who want to cut all 
ties with their country of birth. This group is, however, a rapidly shrinking minor-
ity among international migrants. Most remain attached to their country of 
origin because they have close or extended family there, because they fre-
quently visit this country or consider returning there for good. Even those who 
have fled civil wars or political persecution often want to remain politically in-
volved as citizens in exile. Finally, migrants often also refer to their origins 
when constructing their identities in the receiving country even when they stay 
for good. All these different motives make the nationality of origin important. 
For those who have not fled, it implies the status of external citizenship with a 
right to return, to diplomatic protection and sometimes also to absentee voting 
rights and it serves, for many, as a symbolic marker of identities. 
Sending states also have interests in maintaining ties with voluntary expat-
riates. These interests may be economic, in remittances or in human capital 
among returning migrants, cultural in promoting the use of national languages 
abroad, or political in involving migrants in the political process back home or 
in mobilising them as a foreign policy lobby in the receiving country (Bauböck 
2003). Encouraging expatriates to retain their nationality of origin and en-
hancing the rights of external citizenship are means in the pursuit of these legit-
imate goals. It has often been pointed out that migration ought to be managed 
so that it benefits both receiving and sending states. Recognising external ties 
of nationality contributes to economic growth by encouraging emigrants to send 
remittances or to invest in their countries of origin. Migrants often also accumu-
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late democratic experiences in receiving states that influence their political ac-
tivities towards the sending country and contribute to democratic transition or 
consolidation there. Promoting such mutual benefits requires a change in the 
prevailing notions of integration in receiving states, where such emphasis on 
external ties is often interpreted as a lack of commitment to the host society 
that disqualifies immigrants from access to nationality. 
The most important recommendation that follows from these considerations 
is that immigrant receiving states should generally accept dual nationality 
among first and second generation migrants who have genuine links to both 
countries concerned.While all states in our sample accept dual nationality ac-
quired at birth iure sanguinis, Germany is unique in that it limits dual nationality 
acquired at birth through a combination of ius soli and ius sanguinis by de-
manding that one nationality be renounced by the age of 23. Five countries, 
however, still require the renunciation of former nationality as a condition for 
ordinary naturalisation. All the countries we studied are also sending states with 
provisions in their nationality laws aimed at expatriates and their descendants. 
Most states do not limit the extraterritorial transmission of nationality by ius 
sanguinis to the first generation born abroad (only Belgium, Germany, Ireland 
and the UK do so). Many states have recently also strengthened their political 
ties with expatriates by allowing them to naturalise abroad without losing their 
nationality of origin (Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands), or by introducing 
preferential (re)acquisition of nationality for former nationals (Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) or for immigrants whom they consider as 
sharing a dominant national language, culture and/or ethnic identity (Greece, 
Portugal and Spain). These tendencies have been interpreted as indicating a 
new trend towards the ‘re-ethnicisation’ of citizenship in liberal democracies 
that counterbalances a more general trend towards de-ethnicisation in the ad-
mission of immigrants (Joppke 2003, 2004). It is, however, important to distin-
guish between policies that pursue legitimate sending state interests in transna-
tional migration and those that negatively affect major interests of other 
groups and states. As we will discuss in section 3 below, ethnic preferences in 
naturalisation may be justified in particular circumstances. They are, however, 
problematic in the context of immigration from diverse origins, where they may 
violate the principles of non-discrimination, and in the context of European in-
tegration, where acquisition of nationality entails Union citizenship and the right 
to settle in other Member States. The latter objection is especially salient when 
states permit large groups of former nationals or co-ethnic populations to ac-
quire nationality abroad without requiring a certain period of residence in the 
state (as in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Germany and Ireland). 
As a general normative principle that ought to guide policies with regard 
to both acquisition and loss of nationality, we suggest the idea of stake-holding 
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in a political community. Individuals whose objective living conditions durably 
link their interests to the common good of a particular polity should have a pri-
ma facie claim to the status of membership in that community. This principle 
builds on the concept of a ‘genuine and effective link’ used by the International 
Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case (ICJ Reports 1955, 23). On the one 
hand, it supports the inclusion of immigrants and the maintenance of external 
ties with expatriates but, on the other hand, it restricts the claims to nationality 
and full citizenship rights of temporary migrants, of subsequent generations 
born abroad of more distant emigrant origin9 and of those in search of a ‘na-
tionality of convenience’ for the sake of easier travel, economic investment or 
tax evasion. Although, as explained in Chapter 1, the genuine link criterion has 
been applied very cautiously in international public law (mainly to restrict the 
conferring of nationality where it impacts on claims of personal or territorial 
jurisdiction by other states), we suggest that stakeholding should be considered 
more broadly as also determining the scope of claims made by individuals vis-
à-vis states. 
2.3  Human rights standards 
Chapter 1 discusses at length how international public law tries to balance the 
basic principle that the determination of nationality falls within a reserved do-
main of state sovereignty, with human rights and with the fact that ‘nationality 
by its very nature affects international relations’ (ICJ Reports 1995, 23). From 
a human rights perspective, four major guidelines for minimum standards ought 
to be respected by all states: 
1.  The basic human right of every person to a nationality according to Art. 15 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has generally been 
interpreted as an injunction against policies generating statelessness rather 
than as the individual entitlement of a person to a specific nationality. Art. 
15 (2) UDHR goes beyond this by proclaiming the right to change one’s na-
tionality and protection against arbitrary deprivation. The same principle 
underlying the general human right to a nationality also informs Art. 34 of 
the Geneva Refugee Convention and Art. 32 of the Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons, that require contracting states to facilitate 
the naturalisation of refugees and stateless persons respectively. This ex-
pectation is based on the understanding that stateless persons and persons 
who have lost the protection of their nationality of origin and who are, in 
                                         
9  We suggest below in section 3.7.3. that the automatic transmission of citizenship iure 
sanguinis outside the state territory should end with the emigrants’ grandchildren. This 
would also limit the proliferation of multiple nationality among persons without genuine 
links. 
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this sense, similar to stateless persons have stronger claims to the nationality 
of their host state than other migrants. The Netherlands, Portugal and the 
UK, however, have no special provisions for the naturalisation of refugees. 
Several Member States also have provisions regarding loss of nationality 
that can create statelessness and prevent their ratification of the ECN. We 
strongly recommend that all Member States should accede to the ECN and 
revise their laws accordingly; 
2.  The rights of children to a nationality have generally been regarded as 
more important than access to nationality for adults. Thus, in contrast to Art. 
15 UDHR, Art. 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights only affirms the right of every child to acquire a nationality. An ef-
fective implementation of this right requires that states that otherwise do 
not apply ius soli still transmit their nationality not only to foundlings (a re-
quirement that is met by the nationality laws of all fifteen states), but also 
to children born on their territory to parents who are stateless or of un-
known nationality, which is currently not the case in Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden or the UK. Art. 7 of the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Art. 6(2) of the ECN affirm this particular obligation 
towards any child who does not acquire another nationality at birth. An-
other problem that still has not been fully resolved in some countries in our 
study concerns children born out of wedlock for whom ius sanguinis is ap-
plied only from the mother’s side, but not from the father’s, even if the fa-
ther has custody of the child. This appears to violate both children’s rights 
and the principles of gender equality; 
3.  Applying the general prohibition of discrimination to nationality law means 
that rules for acquisition and loss of nationality should not include arbitrary 
distinctions between different categories of persons. Article 5 (2) of the 
ECN more specifically prohibits discrimination between nationals by birth 
and those who have acquired a nationality after birth. Among European 
states, this kind of discrimination was quite common until the 1980s and we 
have found instances of it in our study. These mainly concern loss of nation-
ality, but also discrimination with regard to family reunification depending 
on how long someone has held Danish nationality or restricted access to 
public service for naturalised persons of non-Greek origin in Greece. An-
other example where different treatment appears prima facie hard to jus-
tify is the current German policy of fully accepting dual nationality at birth 
when it is the result of ius sanguinis among parents of different nationality, 
but requiring that one nationality must be renounced before the age of 23 
when German nationality has been acquired iure soli; 
4.  The specific concern to eliminate gender discrimination has led to important 
reforms in all the nationality laws of the countries we have studied, mostly 
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by making ius sanguinis gender neutral (a patre et a matre) for births in 
wedlock and by ensuring that the conditions for acquisition through mar-
riage to a national apply equally to male and female spouses. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 7, however, transitional provisions for correcting past 
gender discrimination have failed to provide a remedy for past discrimina-
tion for all persons concerned. 
 
Apart from these human rights concerns, democratic states should fully apply 
rule-of-law principles to the acquisition and loss of nationality. They must guar-
antee procedural minimum standards, which include reasonably low fees that 
do not create financial deterrents for applicants, clearly stated requirements 
that do not allow for arbitrarily dismissing applications and that limit adminis-
trative discretion in judging substantive questions, limits on the time within which 
applications have to be decided, written justifications for rejections and a judi-
cial review of decisions with individual rights of appeal (which may be difficult 
where decisions are taken by the legislature). Chapters 2, 3 and 5 of our study 
provide evidence that, in several countries, shortcomings with regard to these 
procedural standards are among the most important obstacles effectively pre-
venting individuals from acquiring or renouncing a nationality, even when they 
meet all the conditions specified by law. 
2.4  Mutually compatible national policies 
As our discussion of immigrants’ and emigrants’ claims to nationality above 
shows, a human rights perspective defines certain minimum requirements but 
cannot fully cover more comprehensive guidelines for democratically inclusive 
policies. A similar differentiation applies to international relations. 
The traditional concern of international law is to promote peaceful relations 
between sovereign states. This requires that sending countries respect the terri-
torial jurisdiction of host states over their nationals abroad. The state of resi-
dence must have the right to grant foreign nationals refugee status or its own 
nationality even without the consent of the country of origin. On the other hand, 
immigration countries must also accept that sending states may grant their na-
tionals abroad not merely diplomatic protection and the right to return, but 
also political and other rights that they can exercise with regard to their coun-
try of nationality and that do not interfere with the territorial jurisdiction of the 
host state. In matters of nationality law, the principle of non-interference with 
the domestic affairs of other states must therefore be applied in a way that 
reconciles territorial jurisdiction with external citizenship rights and obligations. 
Multiple nationality makes separating these two claims a more complex task. 
However, the Council of Europe’s 1963 Convention on Multiple Nationality, 
its subsequent protocols and the 1997 ECN provide principles for how to avoid 
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conflicts between the states concerned by combining priority for legal rights 
and obligations in the country of habitual residence with the reasonable exer-
cise of free choice for the individuals concerned. Given the lack of agreement 
on principles among states and widely diverging state practices, current inter-
national public law cannot, however, be taken as a sufficient standard for re-
solving conflicts over nationality and promoting friendly relations among states 
that are linked to one another by migration flows. From a normative perspec-
tive, we argue for more comprehensive guidelines for international relations 
and progressive reform of international law. 
An initial guideline is that state policies should be able to be generalised in 
the sense that they do not inherently conflict with similar laws and policies 
adopted by other states. This would require states not to adopt policies to-
wards their expatriates that they are not also willing to accept as sending state 
policies towards foreign nationals on their own territory. This principle is differ-
ent from bilateral reciprocity, which requires granting nationals of certain 
states special rights or privileged access to nationality provided that the state’s 
own nationals enjoy similar rights in these other states. It is also different from 
multilaterally agreed norms that apply within a particular community of states, 
such as the European Union. While reciprocity and supranational union gener-
ate different rules for nationals of different countries, generalisability provides 
a normative test for rules that apply to all foreign nationals. 
For example, a state that refuses to release its own nationals when they 
naturalise abroad, or permits them to retain their nationality when acquiring 
another one, should not require that immigrants who obtain its nationality must 
abandon a nationality they have previously held. In Sweden and Finland, re-
cent reforms aimed at broader tolerance of dual nationality have been sup-
ported by public statements that symmetrical rules ought to be applied in both 
cases. Making international generalisability thus an explicit criterion for nation-
ality reform, even in the absence of an obligation under public international 
law, is an example of good practices in nationality reform. Another application 
of this principle concerns provisions for the loss of nationality as a result of 
permanent residence abroad. Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden are 
countries which have applied the ‘genuine link’ principle in such a way that their 
second generation emigrants lose their nationality at a certain age after ma-
jority unless they have special links to their country of nationality. 
Consequently, they should also provide a corresponding right for the se-
cond generation of immigrant origin to acquire their nationality based on the 
assumption that these persons’ links to their country of nationality are just as 
tenuous as those of their own nationals born abroad. A second guideline that 
can be derived from the goal of friendly international relations is the avoid-
ance of negative side effects or perverse incentives for other states. Chapter 1 
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discusses several examples of state policies whose adverse impact on other 
countries can be regarded as violating the principles of international law. For 
example, a state must not deprive expatriates of their nationality with the in-
tention of avoiding its obligation to readmit them in case of expulsion. States 
may also harm the interests of other states when they offer their nationality to 
minorities living abroad whom they consider as co-ethnics, since turning a native 
minority into citizens of an external protector state may undermine the internal 
accommodation of minorities in the country of residence. This is currently not a 
problem in the fifteen countries we have examined, but it is a major issue in 
some of the new EU Member States (for example in relations between Hunga-
ry, Slovakia and Romania). 
For prudential reasons, states should also refrain from adopting policies 
that can be easily circumvented by other states and for ethical reasons they 
should not adopt laws that provide incentives for other states to maintain or 
introduce illiberal provisions in their own nationality laws. Both guidelines can 
be illustrated by the perverse effects of restrictions on dual nationality in natu-
ralisation cases. In order to circumvent Germany’s prohibition of dual nationali-
ty, in the mid-1990s Turkey adopted a policy of guaranteeing its expatriates 
readmission to nationality after renunciation in order to naturalise. In 1999, 
Germany changed its Basic Law that did not previously allow the denationali-
sation of German nationals residing in the country. In 2005, a considerable 
number of dual nationals who had reacquired Turkish citizenship lost their Ger-
man citizenship ex lege and thereby also their voting rights in the 2005 Ger-
man national elections. All the countries in our sample do, however, permit ap-
plicants to retain a previous nationality if the state concerned refuses to release 
its citizens or if the conditions for renunciation are deemed unacceptable. These 
exceptions create perverse incentives for maintaining the illiberal restrictions on 
voluntary renunciation in countries of origin, since liberal reforms would deprive 
migrants of access to multiple nationality and sending states of nationality ties 
to their expatriates. A broader tolerance of dual nationality emerging from 
naturalisation is thus not merely supported by respecting the dual attachments 
of migrants discussed above, but also by taking into account how state policies 
impact each other. Good policies in this area must start from the basic under-
standing that dual nationality is produced jointly by two different states and 
that the rules for regulating it must take into account the interests and policy 
options of the other party. 
3  The impact of European integration on Member State nationality 
The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have clearly stated that only nationals 
of a Member State are Union citizens and that Union citizenship shall comple-
ment not replace Member State nationality. Under current Community law this 
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rules out any separate means of becoming a citizen of the Union without ac-
quiring the nationality of one of its Member States.10 In the Micheletti case, the 
European Court of Justice further clarified that the status of Union citizenship 
cannot be denied to multiple nationals who possess the nationality of a third 
country alongside that of a Member States (Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] 
ECR I-4239). It is, however, less obvious that all nationals of Member States are 
also Union citizens, since some states have made reservations in this respect with 
regard to citizens living in offshore territories. Legal scholars have also sug-
gested that the principle of solidarity between Member States might constrain 
national legislation (mainly in Southern European states) that would turn off-
shore populations into nationals within the meaning of the EU Treaties and 
thereby also into citizens of the Union with the right of admission and residence 
in any of the Member States (de Groot 2003: 21, see also Chapter 1). 
While the regulation of access to Union citizenship has thus been fully de-
volved to Member States, the Commission has nevertheless emphasised that it 
regards citizenship of the Union as a source of legitimation of European inte-
gration and for creating a genuine European identity (ibid.). The European 
Court of Justice has indicated in several decisions that Union citizenship places 
constraints on a Member State’s sovereignty in matters of nationality. In 
Micheletti, the ECJ stated that the competence of each Member State to define 
the conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality is to be exercised with ‘due 
regard to Community law’. In Grzelczyk, the Court of Justice seems to have 
gone further by stating that citizenship of the Union is ‘destined to be the fun-
damental status of nationals of the Member States’ (Grzelczyk (2001) ECR I-
619). This statement could be misinterpreted as indicating a tendency towards 
a federal conception of multilevel citizenship in which nationality in Member 
States will be derived from Union citizenship rather than the other way round. 
The emerging agenda initiated by the Tampere European Council in October 
1999 is much more modest. The presidency conclusions of this meeting endorsed 
‘the objective that long-term legally resident third country nationals be offered 
the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in which they are 
resident’.11 In its communications, the Commission has since gone further. It has 
proposed a status of ‘civic citizenship’ for long-term resident third country na-
tionals as ‘a first step in the process of acquiring the nationality of a Member 
State concerned’ (COM (2000) 757: 20). In 2003, the Commission welcomed 
‘the relaxation of conditions to be fulfilled by applicants for nationality’ and 
advocated a reinforced coordination process to ‘promote the exchange of in-
formation and of best practices concerning the implementation of nationality 
                                         
10  Third Report from the Commission on Citizenship of the Union, COM (2001) 506: 7. 
11  Tampere European Council – Presidency Conclusions, para. 21, last sentence. 
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laws of Member States’ (COM (2003) 336: 30). We recommend that the 
Commission should clarify in a further communication how it expects Member 
States to take into account Community law in their legislation on acquisition and 
loss of nationality. 
In our view, these goals should be strengthened and defined more broadly 
by applying the ‘open method of coordination’ to the nationality laws of Mem-
ber States. The reasons for doing so can be stated as follows: alternative mod-
els of separate access to Union citizenship or of reversing the relation between 
Union citizenship and Member State nationality are currently ruled out by 
Community law and by a lack of political will within all Member States for the-
se more radical reforms. Nevertheless, even the present architecture of Union 
citizenship creates a strong link with Member State nationality that can serve as 
a point of departure for reforming access to nationality. In addition to the nor-
mative arguments in section 1 for minimum standards and guidelines for good 
policies in all democratic states, there are even stronger arguments for promot-
ing normative convergence within the European Union. Since the status of Union 
citizenship is shared by all Member States and since its rights apply throughout 
the territory of the Union, regulating the acquisition and loss of this status 
through 25 non-coordinated national laws creates problems of three kinds: 
firstly, the problem of fairness if conditions for access to the rights of Union citi-
zens are extremely unequal among the Member States, secondly, the problem 
of the adverse impact of actions by one Member State on all others and, 
thirdly, the negative consequences of geographical mobility within the Union on 
the acquisition and loss of nationality. These three problems are not grave 
enough to justify the full harmonisation or 'Communitarisation' of nationality 
law, because Union citizenship is not in any way comparable with nationality 
and because the most fundamental rights are primarily guaranteed under na-
tional legislation in each Member State. Yet they add general weight and 
some specific reasons to the case for minimum standards and the promotion of 
good policies in this area. 
Specific reasons for European coordination in matters of nationality can be 
derived from the third problem mentioned above, i.e. contradictions between 
current nationality laws and the rights of free movement and residence associ-
ated with Union citizenship as well as with long-term resident status for third 
country nationals. These rights have been recently specified and expanded in 
two Council Directives (2003/109/EC and 2004/38/EC respectively). The 
general principle that we suggest is that exercising one’s right of free move-
ment under Community law should not create disadvantages concerning the 
acquisition and loss of nationality in a Member State. This principle can be ap-
plied to resolve three problems: 
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1.  Nine of the fifteen states have provisions in their nationality laws stating 
that, under certain circumstances, nationality may be lost after a certain 
period of residence abroad; five of these countries also apply such provi-
sions to first generation expatriates (Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Nether-
lands and Spain). When applied to residence in other Member States, this 
would have the paradoxical consequence that using one’s right of free 
movement as a Union citizen may result in the loss of that very status (de 
Groot 2003, see also Chapter 1). The Netherlands has therefore modified 
its law so that residence in another Member State does not count towards 
an absence that may lead to a loss of Dutch nationality after ten years. 
Another solution to this problem is, of course, to reform the provisions for 
loss of nationality more generally so that mere residence abroad does not 
lead to a withdrawal of nationality from first generation emigrants. 
2.  A similar argument can be made with regard to the acquisition of nation-
ality. When it comes to meeting the residence requirements for naturalisa-
tion, Union citizens who frequently assert their mobility rights by moving 
between Member States are at a disadvantage compared to others who 
reside permanently in another Member State. This claim is somewhat less 
strong than the claim to protection against loss, since a lack of access to 
another Member State’s nationality does not deprive the person concerned 
of his or her Union citizenship. It is, however, still a relevant consideration 
that exercising one’s right to freedom of movement within the Union should 
not diminish a person’s opportunities to acquire the nationality of another 
Member State where he or she takes up residence for a longer period. 
3.  This argument applies even more forcefully to long-term resident third 
country nationals who, with effect from January 2006, also enjoy the right 
to free movement within the Union, which allows them to transfer their status 
to another Member State after five years of legal residence.12 Their case is 
stronger than that of nationals of Member States since third country na-
tionals might never obtain access to Union citizenship if they make exten-
sive use of their free movement rights and if they never stay long enough in 
any Member States to qualify for naturalisation there. 
 
One possible response to the second problem would be to introduce shorter 
residence periods for the naturalisation of Union citizens in all Member States. 
Currently, only Austria, Germany and Italy provide for such facilitated naturali-
sation for nationals of other Member States. In our view, this is not a desirable 
solution. It would have hardly any significant impact on the naturalisation rates 
                                         
12  See Council Directive concerning the status of third country nationals who are long-term 
residents (EC 2003/109, 25.11.2003). 
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of Union citizen in other Member States. Union citizens naturalise in lower num-
bers than other nationalities because they generally have more rights to lose in 
their country of origin than to gain in their country of residence. A general tol-
erance of dual nationality in naturalisation cases would therefore be a much 
more effective incentive for naturalisation. 
We recommend an alternative approach involving counting years spent in 
other Member States towards a residence requirement for naturalisation.13 
There are various ways in which Member States could still emphasise the im-
portance of residence in the state whose nationality is acquired. They could 
give less weight to years spent in other Member States (for example, by count-
ing only half the time) or they could require that a certain time must have been 
spent in the country immediately before naturalisation. One major advantage 
of this proposal is that it would also address the third problem by providing 
third country nationals with the same opportunities for facilitated naturalisation 
if they have resided for some time in other Member States. This model would 
thus be non-discriminatory, it would highlight the Union as a common space of 
freedom and remove obstacles to enhanced mobility, but would still preserve 
the importance of residential attachment to the state whose nationality is ac-
quired. 
If this proposal does not find sufficient support, the next best policy for 
minimising the conflict between free movement rights and access to nationality 
is to encourage those Member States with excessively long residence require-
ments for naturalisation to reduce these14 and to abandon the condition of unin-
terrupted residence. For example, in the Irish Republic, only the final year be-
fore the application must be without interruption while the rest of the required 
four years of residence can be accumulated over the previous eight years. Irish 
law thus makes it quite easy for mobile Union citizens or third country nationals 
to fulfil a reasonable residence condition. 
Initiating an open method of coordination in matters of nationality law will 
require much greater knowledge, not merely about laws and their implementa-
tion, but also about statistical developments. Chapter 6 documents the incon-
sistent state of statistics on nationality, which are currently scarcely comparable 
across Member States, and makes detailed recommendations on how to im-
prove them. We have therefore been unable to supplement our systematic 
comparison of modes of acquisition and loss with the corresponding statistical 
data. Nationality statistics in several countries do not even allow a calculation 
                                         
13  An example for this kind of rule is provided by the Nordic countries, where residence 
spent in another Nordic state is, under certain conditions, equivalent to residence in the 
country granting nationality. 
14  Eight countries in our sample require five years or less for ordinary naturalisations. 
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of overall rates of acquisition and loss among migrant origin populations. Hav-
ing sufficiently differentiated, reliable and publicly available statistics on na-
tionality is a precondition for well-informed public policies in countries with 
large-scale emigration or immigration. Without good data on acquisition and 
loss of nationality, it is also impossible to estimate the size of migration stocks 
and flows. Official statistics in many countries still wrongly identify migrants 
with foreign nationals and vice versa. As part of the current efforts to generate 
harmonised statistics on migration in Europe, sufficient attention should there-
fore be paid to statistics on nationality. 
4  Legal rules for the acquisition and loss of nationality 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we have categorised the wide variety of legal rules for 
the acquisition and loss of nationality into a limited number of modes that can 
be compared among countries. In this section, we build on the results of this 
comparison, as well as on Chapters 7, 9 and 10, in order to evaluate national-
ity laws and to propose guidelines for reforming them. We do this not so much 
from a legal perspective, but from a sociological and political view that con-
siders how legal regulations affect the interests and rights of individuals. We 
have therefore subdivided the section into aspects that concern specific groups 
of migrants: first generation immigrants and subsequent generations, gender 
inequalities, refugees and stateless persons, co-ethnic immigrants and Union 
citizens, denizens and quasi-citizens, and emigrants. 
4.1  First generation immigrants 
For first generation immigrants, naturalisation based on residence is generally 
the most important mode of acquisition of nationality. The main conditions im-
posed by the Member States for this type of naturalisation concern minimum 
age, residence status and duration of residence, renunciation of previous na-
tionality, clean criminal record, ‘good character’, the financial situation of the 
applicant, language skills and societal knowledge, and proof of integration or 
assimilation. Procedural conditions, such as fees, will be discussed in section 4 of 
this chapter. 
4.1.1 MINIMUM AGE 
In most states the minimum age for residence-based naturalisation is the age of 
majority. No minimum age is required by law in Austria, Spain or Ireland; in 
Germany there is no age threshold for naturalisation based on entitlement. 
Minimum age requirements may be serious obstacles for the naturalisation 
of ‘generation 1.5’, i.e. the children of immigrants who immigrate while below 
the age of majority either with their family or through subsequent family reuni-
fication in the country of destination. Age thresholds of this kind are historical 
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relics from a conception that regards only nationals of voting age as full citi-
zens and that requires informed consent from immigrants in all naturalisations. 
Both considerations are, however, inadequate for children who have spent a 
substantial amount of their childhood in the country of residence. For them, the 
acquisition of nationality expresses a genuine link and protects them from ex-
pulsion to their parents’ homeland. Age thresholds can even exclude many from 
naturalisation although their parents might already be naturalised. We recom-
mend that all minimum age requirements be waived for minor children of immi-
grants who meet a residence requirement. They should have the opportunity to 
naturalise either through extension, i.e. together with one of their parents, or 
independently at a parent’s request (see section 3.2.3. below). 
4.1.2  RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS 
Member States require a minimum residence period of between three years 
(Belgium, for acquisition by naturalisation) and ten years (Austria, Greece, Ita-
ly, Portugal and Spain). Eight states require five years or less. In most countries, 
residence must have been legal and the applicant’s place of habitual residence 
must have been in the state concerned. Generally, residence must have been 
uninterrupted immediately before the application. 
Short residence requirements are preferable for the sake of security of 
residence, social inclusion and political integration. Since full protection against 
expulsion, legal equality and political participation generally still depend on 
nationality, lower residence requirements reduce the risk of creating a large 
and relatively stable group of second-class citizens. With the implementation of 
Council Directive EC/2003/109 in 2006, third country nationals will acquire a 
common long-term resident status after five years of residence in a Member 
State. The same time period could also serve as the normal residence require-
ment for regular naturalisation. At this point, immigrants would then choose be-
tween European denizenship and full membership of the Union and one of its 
Member States. Five years is long enough to acquire genuine links to and prac-
tical knowledge of the country of naturalisation. Applicants for naturalisation 
should then be given the choice between permanent resident status and full 
citizenship. 
We also suggest that all periods of legal residence should be counted and 
that states should accept interruptions. States where immigrants are entitled to 
permanent residence permits on the basis of a prior legal residence of five 
years or less may therefore require that immigrants hold such a permit when 
they apply for naturalisation. Where access to permanent residence status is 
blocked for certain groups or where it depends on criteria such as language 
skills or financial means, we advocate reforming access to this status. As ex-
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plained in section 2, we also propose that periods spent in other Member 
States should count towards the overall residence requirement. 
In order to take into account the existing variety, Member States should 
move towards a common threshold of five years for most naturalisations, but 
either maintain shorter residence requirements for applicants who meet addi-
tional criteria or introduce slightly longer residence requirements for naturalisa-
tion by entitlement rather than by discretionary decision, which would reduce 
the pressure on the naturalisation system. For example, in Belgium, seven years 
is the requirement for the former, whereas three is sufficient for the latter. Aus-
tria grants naturalisation by entitlement after fifteen years in the case of prov-
en and sustained integration, or after thirty years without further conditions, 
which is clearly too long. 
4.1.3  RENUNCIATION OF PREVIOUS NATIONALITY 
At present, only five states in our sample effectively prohibit retention of a 
previous nationality in ordinary naturalisations. However, Dutch and German 
laws allow for more frequent exceptions to this rule than those in Austria, Den-
mark or Luxembourg. The request that one’s previous nationality be renounced 
is a major obstacle to naturalisation among many first generation immigrants. 
Reasons for this reluctance are manifold: in most countries, expatriates who 
have renounced their nationality are treated as foreigners and might thus have 
only limited rights of entry and residence or might need a visa; several coun-
tries restrict the right to inheritance or landed property to their citizens. For 
many immigrants, their nationality of origin also has symbolic value as an ele-
ment of their personal identity. 
Traditional objections to multiple nationality have focused on three reasons: 
conflicts between states over personal jurisdiction, conflicts of loyalty and the 
burdens arising from multiple obligations for individuals, and unjustified privi-
leges from the accumulation of rights. We believe that all three objections can 
be overcome. Recent developments in international law have provided guide-
lines on how to resolve possible conflicts, mainly by giving priority to the rela-
tionship with the state of habitual residence (see Chapter 1). As suggested in 
section 1 of this chapter, the principle of stakeholding can also overcome objec-
tions to the accumulation of rights through multiple nationality. This also applies 
to conflicts of loyalty. The idea that individuals can only be loyal to one state 
relies, on the one hand, on a Hobbesian theory of international relations as a 
state of nature and potential war that is at odds with the emerging regimes of 
international law and institutions and, on the other hand, ignores the fact of 
multiple stakeholding by migrants in several states. Since all the countries in our 
study accept the emergence of dual nationality through ius sanguinis from par-
ents of different nationalities, it is also inconsistent to claim that multiple nation-
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ality must be avoided in naturalisations in order to prevent conflicts between 
states, rights and obligations. The specific argument that multiple nationality 
should be tolerated only when it arises at birth suggests that immigrants must 
provide stronger proof of loyalty than persons born as nationals since only the 
former have prior obligations of loyalty towards another state. It is, however, 
hardly plausible that a person born abroad to a national will have a stronger 
sense of loyalty towards his or her parents’ country than an immigrant who 
chooses to apply for naturalisation after long-term residence in that country. 
States that defend this distinction would therefore have to resort to the prob-
lematic idea that loyalty is a matter of descent rather than of choice. 
Reasonable objections about cumulative rights concern voting rights and 
access to public office in different states. Holders of high public office may be 
asked to renounce a second nationality if the office in question entails a special 
duty of loyalty towards the state. This is, however, no justification for making 
renunciation a condition at the time of naturalisation. Cumulative voting rights 
emerge only in those cases where the state of external nationality allows ex-
patriates to cast absentee ballots. All countries in our sample except Ireland 
and Greece have introduced voting rights for expatriates at least under cer-
tain conditions or for certain categories. The objection is then that multiple vot-
ing is an unfair privilege irreconcilable with the democratic principle ‘one per-
son – one vote’. This principle is, however, not violated if these votes are not 
aggregated because they are cast in separate elections in sovereign states. 
The ‘voting privilege’ argument may, however, apply to Union citizens who are 
nationals of several Member States. Although it may be difficult to prevent, 
multiple voting in European Parliament elections is in principle not allowed for 
either Union citizens residing in another Member State or those holding several 
Member State nationalities. Preventing multiple representation in the Council, 
where composition depends on national election results, presents a more diffi-
cult problem since it would require that states abolish absentee voting rights for 
multiple Union citizens. In our view, this would be not only difficult to implement, 
but also unjustified given the indirect nature of citizens’ representation in the 
Council. The problem of multiple voting would become serious only if the Union 
moved towards a fully federal constitution, in which case it would also have to 
grant voting rights in national elections to Union citizens living in other Member 
States. 
We recommend therefore that Member States abandon renunciation re-
quirements as a condition for naturalisation or at least allow for more, clearly 
stated exceptions. 
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4.1.4  PERSONAL INTEGRITY CLAUSES 
All states either apply criteria of ‘good character’, ‘good moral character’, 
‘good civic conduct’ or ‘respectable life’ or explicitly exclude persons with a 
criminal record from naturalisation. Some states, however, do not define this 
provision clearly (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The other states either 
apply a scheme of graded waiting periods when certain offences have been 
committed (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom), or count offences 
only above a certain threshold (determined in Austria, France and Greece by 
the length of a prison sentence) or offences qualified as grave in different 
ways (Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands). 
The vague definitions of ‘good character’ create considerable uncertainty 
for the applicants. We recommend a clear definition of personal integrity 
clauses that regards only serious criminal convictions as obstacles for naturalisa-
tion. To prevent double jeopardy, convictions deleted from a criminal registry 
should no longer be counted. As we have argued above, children born or 
raised in the country should have unconditional rights of residence and access 
to nationality. For this reason, they should no longer be barred from naturalisa-
tion after they have served a sentence for a crime. 
4.1.5  FINANCIAL SITUATION 
The financial situation of the applicant is completely irrelevant to naturalisation 
in only Belgium and the Netherlands. While states may select economic immi-
grants according to their skills or financial means and while they may limit the 
right to stay for recent immigrants who fail to sustain themselves and become a 
public burden, applying such criteria to naturalisation is problematic from a 
democratic perspective. In a liberal democracy, voting rights must not depend 
on social class. Once immigrants have become permanent residents, denying 
them access to nationality on the grounds of a lack of income creates economic 
barriers to the franchise similar to those that existed in many European states in 
the nineteenth century. Furthermore, financial obstacles to naturalisation do not 
serve any reasonable public policy purpose if the persons excluded have a 
right to stay and to social welfare benefits. Income barriers to naturalisation 
will also hardly serve as an incentive for immigrants to become economically 
self-supporting. We recommend therefore that other states should follow the 
Dutch and Belgian examples and abolish ‘sufficient income’ as a condition for 
naturalisation. Where this is politically not feasible, states should at least ac-
cept that social insurance-based payments (for unemployment or sickness) are 
never an obstacle and that past reliance on supplementary income or other 
public sources of income support do not rule out naturalisation if the person has 
sufficient means at the time of application. As a minimum, all states should ac-
cept that income from contributory social insurance schemes will not count as 
welfare dependency that rules out access to nationality. 
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4.1.6  LANGUAGE SKILLS 
All but four of the fifteen states now demand a certain level of knowledge of 
the official language(s) that has to be demonstrated by a certificate from a 
recognised training institution, by attending a specific course or by an interview 
during the procedure. Knowledge of the main language(s) of the country is an 
important factor in the integration process. Without sufficient knowledge, most 
immigrants remain confined to unskilled jobs and may have problems partici-
pating adequately in society and in the democratic process. Unlike other condi-
tions such as personal integrity clauses or sufficient income, language tests for 
naturalisation may also provide effective incentives for immigrants. Requiring a 
minimum ability to communicate with other citizens in the dominant language is 
therefore a common and reasonable condition for naturalisation. Language skill 
requirements should, however, be handled flexibly so that they work as an in-
centive rather than a deterrent and so that they do not exclude certain groups 
altogether. Mental capacity for learning a new language depends on prior 
education in foreign languages and decreases with age. Elderly persons whose 
jobs or family circumstances have provided them with few opportunities to ac-
quire the local language, or elderly family members joining their children, are 
often unable to learn a new language. 
To prevent language skills becoming a serious hurdle for long-term immi-
grants, states should generally either set requirements at a low level, e.g. sim-
ple conversational skills, or should make the level dependent on the education 
and general living circumstances of the applicant. Elderly or illiterate persons 
should generally be exempted from language tests. For example, in the Neth-
erlands, applicants over the age of 65 do not have to pass a language test. 
Language requirements could also be waived for specific modes of acquisition 
by declaration or entitlement based on the presumption of a stronger link (e.g. 
because of birth, primary socialisation or very long residence in the country) 
than in cases of ordinary naturalisation. The reason for these exemptions is to 
avoid deterring persons who are seen as having a subjective claim to nationali-
ty without further conditions. In multilingual countries, knowledge of one of the 
official languages should be sufficient. 
In terms of good practice in this area, we recommend that immigrants 
should not be obliged to attend specific language courses, but should have the 
choice of proving their knowledge by different means, such as by recognised 
certificate or in an interview. In order to strengthen the incentives to acquire 
language skills, states may reduce the general residence requirements for natu-
ralisation for immigrants who are either native speakers or who pass such tests. 
4.1.7  SOCIETAL KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge of society, its history, constitution or political institutions is a prereq-
uisite for naturalisation in a growing number of states. Whereas language skills 
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are an important resource for integration into the wider society, this is less ob-
vious for societal knowledge, which is often not even shared among native citi-
zens. While practical information about public institutions, as well as general 
facts about society and the political system, may be included in preparatory 
courses for naturalisation, we do not think that these are appropriate subjects 
for knowledge tests that will lead to the exclusion of applicants. 
Where such tests have already been introduced, they should be standard-
ised and cover a clearly defined scope of basic knowledge that must be pub-
licly accessible. So far, this has only been carried out in Denmark and the UK. 
Reference material should be provided free of charge. The lack of a standard-
ised system of certification for societal knowledge leaves room for discrimina-
tory action and a lack of administrative transparency. Negative examples in 
this respect are France and the Netherlands, which both plan to keep the con-
tent of the tests secret. 
4.1.8  PROOF OF INTEGRATION OR ASSIMILATION 
Only a minority of states explicitly require applicants for naturalisation to 
prove their integration or assimilation. In most countries, adequate integration is 
assessed indirectly using personal integrity conditions or language and societal 
knowledge tests. In Austria, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain the 
authorities have a certain leeway to judge if language and societal knowledge 
alone fulfil the criterion. In Belgium, this clause was abolished in 2000 because 
it was inconsistently applied; since then, willingness to integrate has been prov-
en by the mere fact that the person has applied for naturalisation. 
As with ‘good character clauses’, general integration and assimilation re-
quirements lead to uncertainty for the applicants and wide discretion for public 
administrations. We recommend replacing such criteria with clearly defined 
and defensible conditions. 
4.2  Second and third generations 
4.2.1 IUS SANGUINIS ACQUISITION 
Ius soli and ius sanguinis are not two opposing principles, but can and should be 
combined. The nationality laws of all existing states include the acquisition of 
nationality by descent from citizen parents, but many states simultaneously ap-
ply birth in the territory as a relevant criterion. 
In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden ius 
sanguinis is the only way of acquiring nationality at birth (apart from ius soli 
acquisition for foundlings and stateless children). This excludes not just second 
generation children from automatic access to nationality, but even third gen-
eration children whose parents have not been naturalised. In societies where 
larger numbers of immigrants have settled permanently, ius sanguinis ought to 
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be supplemented with elements of ius soli. Otherwise, citizenship will come to 
be seen as an ethnic privilege derived from descent. Facilitated naturalisation 
of children born in the country is no substitute for ius soli, since it still relies on 
the implicit assumption that these children are sufficiently protected by the na-
tionality of another state and should merely be granted an opportunity to 
change their nationality. Only entitlements based on birth in the country or res-
idence during childhood draw the important distinction between first generation 
migrants and their descendants whose genuine link to that society can no longer 
be questioned. 
Among the states we have studied, only France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Spain apply ius sanguinis without further conditions, such 
as parents having been born in the country or marriage status. Granting na-
tionality iure sanguinis independently of the place of birth creates a potentially 
endless proliferation of nationality across generations born abroad, even if the 
persons holding it will never reside in the country concerned. Transferring na-
tionality from generation to generation without any residence qualification is 
problematic since it makes nationality over-inclusive, just as the absence of ius 
soli in an immigrant receiving country makes it under-inclusive. While a second 
generation may need return options and will usually acquire the parents’ moth-
er tongue, the subsequent generation will only retain a genuine link to the 
grandparents’ country in a few cases. If they wish to return to that state, they 
will face the same challenges and problems as any other immigrant and thus 
should not be treated more favourably. 
Unlimited ius sanguinis becomes most problematic when external citizenship 
includes absentee voting rights, since this will allow individuals with no substan-
tive ties to the polity to influence the composition of legislatures whose decisions 
do not affect them. In the context of the European Union, over-inclusive ius 
sanguinis also creates Union citizens born outside the territory of the Union but 
endowed with immigration rights in any Member State. The Union should there-
fore take an interest in limiting the application of ius sanguinis to the first gen-
eration born abroad. In contrast to territorial limitations, making the acquisition 
of nationality by descent conditional upon the marriage status of the parents or 
the sex of the parent who is a national may violate the principles of gender 
equality and non-discrimination between children born in and out of wedlock. 
We propose the following guidelines: if a child is born out of wedlock in the 
country to a foreign mother and a father who is a national, then either ius soli 
or ius sanguinis a patre should secure access to the country’s nationality for the 
child. Ius sanguinis should apply in any case automatically and retroactively if 
the father legitimates the child after marriage with the mother. 
We therefore urge Member States to consider abolishing all qualifying cri-
teria for ius sanguinis except country of birth. Outside the state’s territory, na-
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tionality should be inherited automatically only if one parent is a first genera-
tion emigrant or resides abroad temporarily. Grandchildren of expatriates 
whose parents have not themselves resided in the country concerned for a 
longer period should no longer inherit their parents’ nationality unless they 
would otherwise find themselves stateless. 
4.2.2  IUS SOLI ACQUISITION 
Eight of the fifteen Member States apply methods of nationality acquisition 
derived from birth in that country. At birth or immediately thereafter, ius soli 
can apply ex lege (as in Germany and the UK for the second generation and in 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Spain for the third generation). Alterna-
tively, it may require a declaration or specific act by a parent (such as for the 
second generation in Belgium, Ireland and Portugal). Finally, acquisition of na-
tionality after birth can also be based on ius soli (within certain age brackets, 
such as for the second generation in France or without age limits). 
Common qualifying criteria for ius soli are that a parent either must have 
resided in the country for a certain time or with a certain type of residence 
permit (Germany, Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom) or that a parent must 
also have been born in the country (in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
Spain). In the period under investigation (i.e. after 1985), unqualified ius soli 
existed only in the Irish Republic until 2004; since 2005 certain residence re-
quirements for parent(s) have applied there as well. 
Most countries have parental residence requirements or impose age limits 
for ius soli. Even after the reform of 2004, Ireland has the most liberal provi-
sions with no time limit for using the right to apply for an Irish passport if at 
least one parent is either a permanent resident or has been resident in Ireland 
for three of the four years prior to the child’s birth. Germany represents a sin-
gular case where dual nationals who have acquired German nationality at 
birth by ius soli must renounce one of their nationalities before the age of 23. 
This rule is discriminatory since it does not apply to dual nationality acquired 
by ius sanguinis from parents, one of whom is a German national.15 The under-
lying idea seems to be that the loyalty of dual nationals is questionable and 
needs to be tested. Yet, the assumption that a certain class of nationals born in 
the territory cannot be trusted to be loyal is contrary to the principle of birth-
right citizenship. 
We advocate a generational approach to the acquisition of nationality. 
While first generation migrants need to apply for naturalisation, the second 
generation of immigrant descent should have an ius soli-based entitlement to 
                                         
15  Germany therefore had to make a reservation to the European Convention on National-
ity that explicitly prohibits depriving dual nationals of any nationality acquired at birth. 
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the nationality of their country of birth. Unconditional ius soli is, however, both 
over-inclusive (by giving nationality to children of parents whose stay in the 
country is purely accidental or temporary) and under-inclusive (by not covering 
the ‘generation 1.5’ children born abroad who join their parents while they are 
minors). We therefore recommend strong naturalisation entitlements for children 
who have grown up in the country since early childhood and a conditional ius 
soli for the second generation if one parent has resided legally in the country 
for a period that should not exceed the requirements for permanent resident 
status. From our perspective, it is preferable that this conditional ius soli for the 
second generation apply ex lege immediately at birth and it should not need to 
be confirmed later by a requirement that another nationality acquired at birth 
be renounced. One argument for applying ius soli only at the age of majority 
is that it gives young adults a choice. This option should, however, be semi-
automatic, i.e. it should not require an application or active declaration, but 
should merely involve a negative option of rejecting a nationality that is other-
wise acquired automatically, as is now the case in France. If ius soli is applied 
only at the age of majority, then there should be additional strong entitlements 
to the acquisition of nationality while the person is still a minor and absolute 
security of residence for those whose parents do not make use of this option. As 
mentioned above, we further recommend that children should have a right to 
be heard in decisions that affect their nationality well before the age of major-
ity. 
4.2.3  FACILITATED NATURALISATION OF MINOR CHILDREN 
Minor children can acquire nationality either independently from their parents 
or via extension of their parents’ naturalisation. As pointed out above, an enti-
tlement to naturalisation based on residence can be more inclusive than pure ius 
soli, provided the residence period is sufficiently short and there are no further 
conditions attached. The Swedish case where minor children are entitled to nat-
uralisation after five years of residence can be mentioned as an example of 
good practice. 
Provisions for the extension of naturalisation to minor children are unknown 
only in Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In eight states (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden)16 minor children become 
nationals ex lege under certain conditions when their parents acquire nationali-
ty. Other conditions concern residence in the country, the custody of the parent 
acquiring nationality, or that their child is not yet married. Many Member 
States also apply further conditions, such as a certain period of residence, the 
                                         
16  In Sweden and Denmark, ex lege extension depends in certain cases on how the child’s 
parents acquire nationality. 
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absence of recent criminal convictions and language skills, or demand the ex-
plicit consent of children above a certain age. 
Consent of the child is an important consideration in decisions about the 
child’s nationality. The Convention on the Rights of the Child recognises the child 
as a subject with his or her own needs and a right to be heard and to have his 
or her views taken into consideration increasingly until full autonomy is 
achieved at the age of eighteen. Several states have provisions that strengthen 
the child’s position vis-à-vis the parents by requiring that the child be heard in 
the naturalisation procedure or must apply himself or herself (with parental 
consent). Age thresholds for involving minor children in this way range from 
twelve years in Nordic countries to fourteen in Austria and sixteen in Germany. 
We suggest that hearing the child should be a general requirement based on 
Art. 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that children 
have the right to express their views in all matters affecting them and that the-
se views shall be given due weight ‘in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child’. After the age of twelve or fourteen, children should have the right to 
apply themselves with parental consent or be given the right to challenge a 
parental decision about their nationality. 
The naturalisation of minor children should be determined by two princi-
ples. The primary principle is a socialisation-based right to nationality, the sec-
ondary principle is family unity. The former consideration implies that they 
ought to have access to nationality independently of their parents, the latter 
suggests that naturalisation of one of their parents should be extended to them 
ex lege without further qualifying conditions. Since family unity is a secondary 
concern, it should not overrule a child’s interest in nationality. Even if parents 
themselves do not qualify for naturalisation they should be able to apply for 
their minor children who have grown up in the country. 
Minor children who have already lived in the country for some time when a 
parent is naturalised should not face higher obstacles for the acquisition of na-
tionality than those who join a parent who already is a national. For both 
groups we advocate a greatly simplified naturalisation procedure without resi-
dence requirements or acquisition by declaration. Adopted children should be 
treated identically to natural children, if their adoption was valid under na-
tional law. 
4.3  Family-based naturalisation: eliminating gender discrimination 
By the mid 1980s, all the states in our sample had abolished gender-specific 
rules for naturalisation and all have introduced specific rules to facilitate the 
naturalisation of spouses of nationals. In seven states, this is achieved by 
strengthening their claim to acquisition compared to other applicants, e.g. by 
making it a declaration, option or entitlement instead of a discretionary grant. 
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In the remaining states, spouses of nationals find more favourable conditions 
but there is no difference with regard to the type of acquisition. As a condition 
for spousal transfer or nationality, most countries apply one or both of the fol-
lowing criteria: a minimum duration of marriage or living in a common house-
hold (ranging from six months to three years) and a certain time of residence in 
the country by the spouse (which is longest in Denmark, at six to eight years, 
conditional upon the duration of the marriage). In special cases (e.g. spouses of 
nationals living abroad) the duration of required marriage or cohabitation may 
even be five to ten years and some states then also demand that the spouse 
who is a national should already have held nationality for up to ten years. 
Apart from facilitating the acquisition of nationality for spouses of nationals, 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg extend naturalisation from 
a main applicant to a spouse and to minor children living in the same household 
by strengthening their legal claims or reducing their residence requirements. Six 
countries (Austria, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) under 
certain conditions also allow the acquisition of nationality by spouses of nation-
als who live permanently abroad; five more grant this right only to spouses of 
nationals who work in the public service abroad (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and the UK). Marital transfer of a nationality abroad corresponds 
to a relevant interest by the national concerned only if he or she plans to return 
to the country of origin and wants to secure full legal rights for his or her 
spouse for that purpose. Such extraterritorial acquisitions should therefore be 
limited to the spouses of first generation expatriates for the same reasons as 
those applicable to extraterritorial ius sanguinis. 
The main argument for facilitated naturalisation of spouses is the principle 
of family unity in matters of nationality. Another important consideration con-
cerns the security of residence attached to the status, which gives the spouse the 
necessary independence to leave his or her partner and to remain in the coun-
try after a divorce or the partner’s death. Facilitated naturalisation of spouses 
is a major element in securing women’s rights in migration; the qualifying re-
quirements should therefore be low and the procedure simple. Many Member 
States have introduced minimum duration of marriage requirements mainly to 
combat fraudulent marriages. Nevertheless, for this purpose a period of one or 
two years seems to be sufficient. Instead of imposing longer waiting periods, 
states could require some documentary evidence that the partners share a 
common household. To secure equal treatment of heterosexual and homosexual 
partnerships, the status of ‘civil marriage’, which is granted in many Member 
States as an alternative legal relationship, should be recognised in the same 
way as marriage. Member States are encouraged also to grant facilitated 
naturalisation to unmarried partners if they have lived in a common household 
for a certain period of time. In cases of extension of naturalisation to spouses, 
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the requirements should be the same as for facilitated naturalisation of the 
spouses of nationals. Currently only Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden grant 
this right to unmarried heterosexual couples as well as to registered or married 
homosexual ones. Four more states (Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Spain), 
however, also recognise the latter in matters of nationality. 
In recent years, gender discrimination in the transfer of nationality to chil-
dren by descent from the mother’s side has been abolished, but problems have 
occurred in many countries due to the limited transitional period, during which a 
maternal nationality could be passed to the child retroactively (see Chapter 
10). The result is to exclude an ex post maternal transfer of nationality to chil-
dren born before a certain date. This lack of full retroactive effect for legisla-
tion perpetuates past gender discrimination. This should be rectified. 
4.4  Facilitated naturalisation for co-ethnics, co-linguals and Union citizens 
With the exception of Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
UK17 all Member States facilitate naturalisation for nationals of certain coun-
tries or origins, such as for Nordic citizens in the Nordic states, for EU citizens in 
Austria, Germany and Italy or for citizens from former colonial territories, co-
lingual or co-ethnic groups in France, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain. A 
distinct group of countries (Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain)18 
grant their nationality on the grounds of cultural affinity, even to persons resid-
ing abroad. As discussed in section 3.2.7.5, affinity-based privileged access to 
nationality is usually grounded in ethnic conceptions of nationality and sus-
tained by traditions of emigration and recent histories of immigration, pressure 
from expatriate communities and state policies to support or repatriate ethnic 
diasporas. 
Privileged access to nationality based on a person’s nationality or ethnicity 
shouldgenerally be regarded as a suspicious classification that conflicts with the 
principles of nondiscrimination. 
There are, however, several arguments in favour of such distinctions that 
need to be taken into account. Firstly, in the process of nation-building shortly 
after independence, a state may give preferential access to its nationality to 
diaspora communities. Secondly, a state may accept special duties towards 
nationals of former colonies whose economic and cultural lives have been 
shaped by the colonial power and who have in the past held a status of impe-
rial subjection. Thirdly, a state may also accept that it has special duties to ad-
                                         
17  The UK, however, has special rules for access to full citizenship by certain categories of 
overseas nationals with restricted citizenship. 
18  Italy was part of this group until 1997 but now generally requires residence in Italy. 
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mit coethnic individuals from countries where they are persecuted because of 
their minority identity. 
Fourthly, states may give preferential access to nationality to immigrants 
from co-lingual countries because these will integrate more easily. Lastly, states 
may grant facilitated access to nationality on the basis of reciprocity or for a 
group of states with which they are linked by multilateral agreements, alliances 
or unions. 
The first three arguments are reasonable only if the qualifying conditions 
are clearly present, i.e. if states are still in the initial stages of national consoli-
dation, if postcolonial ties are very strong or if a co-ethnic minority abroad 
actually faces persecution. Even where this is the case, the legitimacy of pref-
erential access to nationality will depend on the overall demographic pattern 
of immigration. In countries with large-scale immigration from diverse countries 
of origin, picking out some of these for preferential treatment will inevitably 
create a sense of discrimination among immigrants when they see that later 
arrivals, who are in many ways less integrated, can ‘jump the queue’. 
The fourth argument about the easier cultural integration of co-linguals ap-
plies more plausibly to admission to immigrant status than to nationality. In or-
der to facilitate integration, a country of immigration may give preference in 
immigration to those who speak a major language19 and it should promote 
shared knowledge of such language(s) among all immigrants. The additional 
importance of language skills for full participation in the political process can 
be easily taken into account through language tests for naturalisation that do 
not discriminate by national origin. Countries that attach high value to lan-
guage skills may reduce the general residence requirements for naturalisation 
for immigrants who are either native speakers or who pass such tests. In order 
to avoid indirect discrimination, these tests should, however, be set at a level of 
simple conversational skills where adult newcomers have a fair chance of pass-
ing. 
The final argument has already been addressed in section 2, where we 
recommended that instead of reducing residence requirements for the naturali-
sation of Union citizens, residence periods spent in other Member States should 
count for both Union citizens and for third country nationals. In our view, reci-
procity is a relevant principle in international relations, but it should not deter-
mine differentiation in domestic rights and legal statuses for migrants of differ-
ent national origins (Bauböck 2005). This would be different if the European 
Union moved towards a federal constitution. In a federation, citizenship of a 
constituent state or province is acquired automatically through residence rather 
                                         
19  For example, in the Canadian immigration system, immigrants who speak English or 
French are given extra points. 
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than naturalisation and includes full voting rights in regional elections. Facilitat-
ed naturalisation could be an intermediate step if the Union decided to move in 
this direction. This would, however, entail a complete overhaul of the architec-
ture of Union citizenship with a shift of competences in matters of nationality 
from the Member States to the Union. In the foreseeable future, we do not ex-
pect such a fundamental change. 
While we therefore do not recommend generalising current regulations in 
Austria, Germany, Italy or the Nordic states for all EU citizens residing in other 
EU states, these provisions are useful domestic benchmarks for assessing the 
conditions for naturalisation of immigrants of other origins. If Union citizens can 
meet the conditions for naturalisation after four years in Austria or Italy, then 
the long residence requirement of ten years for third country nationals in these 
countries appears all the more difficult to justify. 
4.5  Denizens, quasi-citizens and citizens with restricted rights 
The status and rights of denizens and quasi-citizens in the Member States has 
been described in Chapter 10. Denizenship is characterised by a high level of 
security of residence, free access to the labour market, generally equal civil 
liberties and social welfare rights and, in some Member States, local voting 
rights as well. Compared to citizens, denizens generally lack absolute protec-
tion from expulsion, national voting rights, unrestricted access to public office 
and the right to Union citizenship. Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of 
long-term resident third country nationals, that has been implemented with ef-
fect from January 2006, paves the way for common European denizenship (but 
is not applicable in Denmark, Ireland or the UK). Member States remain, how-
ever, free to impose specific requirements such as integration and language 
tests on access to this status and the status can also be quite easily lost follow-
ing longer periods of absence. 
Denizenship has an important impact on naturalisation. The more access to 
employment, to welfare benefits or to family reunification is restricted for long 
term resident foreign nationals and the more insecure their legal status, the 
stronger the incentives to naturalise for purely instrumental reasons. For deni-
zens with a strong set of rights, there are few reasons for naturalisation apart 
from a subjective identification with their country of residence and the desire to 
participate fully in the democratic process. This may reduce the number of nat-
uralisations but it also makes an application for naturalisation a voluntary deci-
sion to join the political community. The other factor that will reduce the pro-
pensity to naturalise is when states impose further conditions for access to na-
tionality that are difficult to meet. In our view, denizens already enjoy a recog-
nised status of permanent membership in society. Instead of deterring them 
from naturalisation through additional requirements such as income tests and 
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longer residence periods, they should be encouraged to naturalise. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 9, in some countries we have observed the status of en-
hanced denizenship that we have called quasi-citizenship This status is charac-
terised by nearly identical rights to those of nationals of the country of resi-
dence, including voting rights or access to public office at local or national lev-
els, and full protection from expulsion. This is a status for a certain group of 
persons who are singled out by the state as deserving enhanced security of 
residence and other rights of citizenship without naturalisation. Often these are 
groups with special relationships with the state because of former colonial ties 
or ethnic affinities. 
Where the status of quasi-citizenship exists for large groups of immigrants, 
it may provide a benchmark for enhancing denizenship rights for other immi-
grants with a weaker legal status. Quasi-citizenship should, however, never be 
interpreted as a status that makes access to full citizenship redundant. This 
would devalue the meaning of citizenship as a status of full membership of a 
democratic polity that includes all permanent residents. Granting denizens and 
quasi-citizens almost full citizenship rights while making it difficult for them to 
naturalise would contribute to sustaining exclusionary ethno-cultural concepts of 
national community. Instead, both denizens and quasi-citizens should be en-
couraged to naturalise and they should be granted the same conditions for 
facilitated access. 
The fifteen states examined include not merely non-nationals with nearly 
equal rights, but also nationals with less than equal rights. In Chapter 8 we 
have documented various restrictions of rights and additional duties imposed on 
multiple nationals and on naturalised citizens. The latter type of restriction con-
flicts with the principle of non-discrimination between nationals by birth and by 
naturalisation asserted in ECN Art. 5 (2). This principle makes any differentia-
tion of rights between persons who have acquired nationality in different ways 
prima facie suspect. We may, nevertheless, evaluate the social impact of re-
stricted rights for naturalised persons by asking whether exclusion is permanent 
or temporary and whether the range of liberties and opportunities affected is 
broad or rather narrow. Using these criteria, we identify several specifically 
problematic examples of unequal citizenship, among them restrictions on family 
reunification in Denmark for persons who have held nationality for less than 28 
years, limitations on the employment of naturalised persons in the public sector 
in Greece, and the several categories of British nationals – British Overseas 
Citizens, British Subjects, British Protected Persons and British Nationals (Over-
seas) – who are subject to immigration control. Since these persons also cannot 
pass on their nationality to their children, these categories will, however, disap-
pear in the next generation. 
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4.6  Refugees and stateless persons 
Refugees are persons who have been deprived of protection by the state of 
which they are nationals. Their need for access to the nationality of their host 
country is therefore more urgent than that of other immigrants. This is acknowl-
edged by the Geneva Convention as well as by the European Convention of 
Nationality, which both demand facilitated naturalisation for refugees (see also 
Chapter 1). All states in our study except Portugal and the United Kingdom 
have special clauses for easier naturalisation of recognised refugees or facili-
tate their access in practice. This is mainly achieved by a reduction of the re-
quired residence period. Those states that require proof of the loss of a previ-
ous nationality make exceptions for refugees. In a few countries (France, Lux-
embourg and Ireland), refugees are also exempt from the fulfilment of several 
material conditions, such as language knowledge, by law or by discretionary 
decision. France currently has the most liberal policy since it does not require 
any minimum period of residence for the naturalisation of refugees. 
In order to ensure the fast and easy naturalisation of refugees, Member 
States should abolish waiting periods or reduce them to a minimum; further-
more, language or societal knowledge, income or integration criteria that refu-
gees might find hard to fulfil should be abolished or reduced. If Member States 
choose to set minimum residence requirements, these should not exceed two 
years and the time spent in the country during the recognition procedure should 
be counted. 
The international conventions on statelessness and the ECN also contain 
provisions for facilitated naturalisation of stateless persons and limit the possi-
bility for excluding such persons from access to nationality on the grounds of 
criminal convictions. All countries except Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain have 
rules facilitating the acquisition of nationality by stateless persons after birth. 
Eight countries apply the same rules as for refugees. Austria and the United 
Kingdom, however, only give stateless persons born in the country (or the chil-
dren of UK nationals) privileged access to nationality. Further conditions in oth-
er countries include a minimum time of residence or age. 
Stateless persons have an even stronger claim to naturalisation than refu-
gees. They should be granted access after a shorter period of residence and 
should be exempt from other conditions for naturalisation. For stateless children 
born in the country, the same regulations should apply as for foundlings, which 
is currently not the case in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden or the 
UK. 
4.7  Emigrants 
All the states in our sample are not only destinations for recent immigration, but 
also sending countries. Often, their nationality laws have been shaped by a 
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historic tradition of emigration much more than by receiving immigrants. Atti-
tudes towards expatriates do, however, vary strongly. While some countries 
consider those who have resided abroad for some time as no longer having a 
genuine link to their country of origin, others encourage even their descendants 
to retain their citizenship of origin and facilitate reacquisition by former citizens 
and their offspring. 
4.7.1  RENUNCIATION 
According to Art. 15 UDHR, no-one shall be arbitrarily denied the right to 
change his or her nationality. Art. 8 of the ECN obliges all states to permit re-
nunciation unless the person becomes stateless, but also allows a refusal of re-
nunciation unless the person is habitually resident abroad. Currently, residence 
abroad is a precondition for renunciation only in Ireland, Italy and Spain. In ten 
states in our sample, renunciation becomes effective ex lege if all the formal 
conditions are met. Only in Denmark, Finland, France, Greece and Sweden 
have the authorities at least some discretion to refuse a release from nationali-
ty. In Greece, the authorities do not even have to justify a negative decision. 
Apart from requiring that the person renouncing a nationality must have access 
to another one, renunciation may depend on other conditions such as age, com-
pleted military service, or the absence of criminal investigations. In five Mem-
ber States (Austria, Finland, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom) a 
renunciation fee ranging from � 51 to � 400 has to be paid. 
Two considerations are relevant in determining nationality renunciation pol-
icies in liberal democracies. The first is securing individual liberty by allowing 
citizens to opt out of their membership. Denying this right of exit is a hallmark 
of authoritarian states. Renunciation should therefore never be a matter of dis-
cretion by the authorities and should not be deterred by the charging of fees. 
We recommend therefore that release from nationality should be granted au-
tomatically if the formal criteria are met and the applicant has fulfilled all his 
or her citizenship duties. The second consideration is that a democratic state has 
a legitimate interest in preventing nationals living within its territory from choos-
ing another nationality for the sake of escaping from citizenship duties, while 
freeloading on the protection and rights provided by the state to its residents. 
States may therefore make renunciation conditional upon prior emigration. Lib-
eral democratic principles regarding nationality are thus characterised by a 
double asymmetry between immigrants and emigrants and between acquisition 
and loss. In the state territory, immigrants have a claim to naturalisation but are 
not included automatically without their consent, whereas those who already 
possess nationality are similarly not free to renounce it. Outside the territory, 
emigrants have an unconditional right to renounce their nationality whereas 
those who want to acquire it must have special reasons for being admitted. 
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4.7.2  RETENTION AND REACQUISITION 
First generation emigrants should generally have the right to retain their na-
tionality of origin unless they themselves decide to renounce it when they ac-
quire the nationality of their host state or subsequently. This right is frequently 
restricted in two ways: firstly, by depriving expatriates of their nationality 
when they naturalise in their host country and, secondly, by withdrawing na-
tionality on the grounds of length of residence abroad or other indicators of a 
loss of attachment. Currently, nine Member States provide for an automatic loss 
of nationality when their expatriates acquire a foreign nationality, while only 
five require that immigrants renounce their nationality when naturalising. Emi-
grants of Dutch, Finnish, Irish or Spanish nationality may also lose that nationali-
ty due to longer residence abroad provided they would not then become 
stateless. This amounts to an expiry date for dual nationality acquired by natu-
ralisation abroad. We believe that Member States should generally accept 
dual nationality among first generation immigrants as well as emigrants. As a 
minimum standard, we suggest that persons born and raised in the country 
should never lose their nationality ex lege merely because of long residence 
abroad. If there is a provision that nationality can be lost when there is no 
longer a presumption of a genuine link, the persons affected should always 
have the possibility of fighting a withdrawal of nationality by proving their 
attachment to the country of birth. 
First generation emigrants may also have the need to return to their coun-
tries of birth at some stage in their lives, even if they have naturalised in an-
other country. Facilitating the reacquisition of nationality is often an important 
part of a state’s policy of maintaining ties with its emigrants or their descend-
ants. 
In this area, nationality laws are extremely different and heavily influ-
enced by particular histories and concerns that overlap with those of affinity-
based access to nationality for immigrants of certain origins (see Chapter 3). 
Some states offer very generous reacquisition, especially for former citizens 
who return to the country. In Italy, former nationals reacquire nationality after 
one year of residence in the country or even earlier, if they declare their will to 
take up residence and do so within a year thereafter. Reacquisition is also fair-
ly easy in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Portugal and Sweden. In 
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain the rules of reacquisition depend on 
whether former nationals originally acquired nationality by birth or by natural-
isation. 
We suggest that the reacquisition of nationality should be made as easy as 
possible for first generation emigrants, particularly if the loss of nationality was 
the result of marriage or the prohibition of dual nationality, if it occurred under 
specific historic circumstances, such as a period of authoritarian government, or 
Bauböck et al.: Acquisition and Loss of Nationality  
 
 
60 
 
if nationality was lost while the person was a minor. In these cases, there should 
be no residence requirements. If reacquisition leads to dual nationality, states 
should, however, make sure that this will also be accepted by the other state 
concerned. In other cases, the conditions for reacquisition should focus on time 
of residence in the country. Rules making reacquisition dependent on whether 
nationality had previously been acquired at birth or by naturalisation discrimi-
nate between former citizens and should be abolished. 
4.7.3  RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF EMIGRANTS 
Most rights associated with citizenship depend on presence or residence in the 
country. The quintessential external citizenship rights of emigrants are diplo-
matic protection and the right to be (re)admitted to their country of nationality. 
Thirteen of the fifteen countries, however, also grant their expatriates voting 
rights under certain conditions; of the six states where there is still general con-
scription, only Germany exempts long-term emigrants from military service. 
With regard to voting rights, the main objections are that emigrants are not 
exposed to election campaigns and will not be affected by the legislation in 
which they are represented. These arguments have been somewhat weakened 
by the growth of transnational activities and links. New communication and 
transportation technologies allow emigrants to be politically well-informed and 
family links, frequent travels or eventual return imply that they will be affected 
by legislation passed in their country of nationality. We still believe that the 
principle of stakeholding requires limiting absentee voting rights to the first 
generation of emigrants. Birth or prior residence in the country is therefore a 
reasonable condition for granting voting rights to expatriates. 
4.7.4  DESCENDANTS OF FORMER NATIONALS 
Several states have rules for the acquisition of nationality for relatives of for-
mer or deceased nationals; this mainly affects only children or grandchildren. In 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain, facilitated conditions for natu-
ralisation apply; in other countries, preferential naturalisation based on cultural 
affinity overlaps with the provisions for descendants of former nationals. Ger-
many, Ireland and Portugal even allow discretionary naturalisation of de-
scendants of former nationals who have their habitual residence abroad. As 
with other modes of acquiring nationality abroad, a test of genuine links ought 
to be applied both for domestic reasons (in order to prevent persons being 
given access to citizenship rights without being affected by political decisions in 
the country) and for supranational reasons (in order to limit the capacity of 
Member States to create Union citizens outside EU territory who can use their 
mobility rights to settle in any other Member State). Children of first generation 
emigrants often maintain genuine ties with the country of origin of their parents 
and frequently learn their mother tongue at home, whereas this is rarely the 
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case among subsequent generations. Grandchildren or more distant descend-
ants of emigrants should therefore have to meet the same conditions for natu-
ralisation as any other immigrant and should generally be given access to na-
tionality only after establishing residence in the country. 
5  Institutions and procedures for naturalisation 
In this section we focus only on naturalisation and renunciations. While institu-
tional structures and procedures may also be relevant for determining national-
ity at birth or automatic loss and withdrawal, naturalisation and renunciation 
are those modes of acquisition and loss for which public authorities have to 
communicate with individual applicants in order to reach decisions. They there-
fore present many more opportunities for applying the law in different ways 
that will affect the outcome. 
5.1  Institutional arrangements 
In several countries, regional and local authorities have substantial powers to 
implement nationality laws. This is particularly true in Austria and Germany, 
which are federal states, but also in unitary states such as France,20 Italy and 
the Netherlands, where local or regional administrations are in charge of inter-
views, tests and gathering documents that are then passed on to central state 
authorities. In such countries, we also find that cases are often handled differ-
ently in urban and in rural areas, where civil servants have less experience with 
administrative routine in naturalisation procedures. 
On the one hand, nationality concerns the relationship between an individ-
ual and the state, not a region or a municipality. States thus should guarantee 
equal treatment throughout their territory through uniform implementation of 
the law and final decisions should remain with central state authorities. On the 
other hand, decentralisation may reduce administrative overload when there 
are large numbers of applications. The processing of the application by local 
and regional authorities might improve the speed and quality of the decision, 
provided there are clear rules for interviewing and assessments and discretion-
ary powers are limited. Institutional approaches to naturalisation also differ 
widely with regard to the general degree of discretion of the authorities. Only 
in Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands does the fulfilment of all criteria 
lead automatically to naturalisation. In many countries, vague terms such as 
integration and good character requirements open up wide scope for discre-
tion and allow policy considerations that have n relation to the merits of an in-
dividual case to determine decisions. Discretionary powers are exceptionally 
                                         
20  Zie Hagedorn (1998). 
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wide in Italy and Greece (for naturalisations of foreigners of non-Greek origin 
or ethnicity). In Portugal, the Ministry of the Interior can deny applications not in 
its own interest even when all the requirements are fulfilled. In Austria, France, 
Ireland and the UK there is also considerable room for discretion, which in the 
former two countries is limited to a certain extent by judicial review. In Den-
mark, naturalisations are decided in parliament, which circumvents judicial con-
straints. In order to guarantee equal treatment for applicants, Member States 
should aim to limit the discretionary powers of the authorities by converting 
more modes of acquisition and loss into entitlements and through clearly de-
fined requirements. If applications are turned down, the authorities should be 
obliged to justify their decisions and applicants should also have the opportuni-
ty to complain to a higher administrative authority or an ombudsman. All deci-
sions concerning the acquisition or loss of nationality should in principle be the 
subject of judicial review and a right of appeal by the person concerned. This 
right is jeopardised where decisions about naturalisations are formally taken 
not by the executive branch of government but by the legislature. Denmark 
and Greece currently have neither a requirement that negative decisions must 
be justified nor the right of appeal against them. In Belgium this is true for dis-
cretionary naturalisation after three years, but not for naturalisation by decla-
ration after seven years. In Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden, 
the appeal instances may also overturn the decision made by the initially re-
sponsible authority and grant nationality themselves, instead of referring the 
case back to the lower instance. The latter model can serve as example of 
good practice in this matter. 
5.2  Preparing the application 
5.2.1  PROVISION OF INFORMATION 
Access to naturalisation depends not only on formal conditions and procedural 
hurdles, but also on informing potential applicants. Generally, Member States 
do not see it as their task to encourage naturalisation.21 Thus, most countries 
only provide information on naturalisation legislation and procedures on the 
web sites of the relevant authorities or via booklets or brochures covering fre-
quently asked questions, but they do not engage in outreach activities or sys-
tematic counselling. These materials are generally published in the national 
language only as well as, occasionally, in English but only rarely in the lan-
guages spoken by larger groups immigrants. Specific counselling services pro-
vided by the authorities only exist in five states (France, Germany, Luxem-
                                         
21  Only Germany has run an official naturalisation campaign, encouraging foreign resi-
dents to acquire German nationality, furthermore specific campaigns have been run in 
some German Länder (see Chapter 5). 
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bourg, Portugal and Sweden) In all the other countries, the applicant has to 
approach the relevant administration, a lawyer or an NGO to find out about 
the details of the procedure. In Greece and Portugal, NGOs report that the 
authorities tend to deter applicants from applying for naturalisation when con-
tacted with requests for information. 
The lack of systematic information and counselling in naturalisation matters 
is a serious challenge to the quality of public service. Preparing for naturalisa-
tion is considered a task only for the applicant, not for the administration. This 
reflects the lack of interest by Member States in their potential future nationals. 
Good administrative practice includes the provision of information geared to 
the needs of the target group. Based on this principle, foreign nationals who 
meet the basic residence criterion should be actively informed about naturalisa-
tion legislation and procedures. 
While external counselling by other authorities or NGOs may be useful, it 
is no substitute for counselling services by the administration in charge of natu-
ralisations, where all the expertise is available and may be used to find the 
best solution for the client. Information and counselling should cover the law and 
the procedures, need for specific action and the likelihood of success (as is cur-
rently the case in Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands). These ser-
vices should be free of charge and easily accessible (e.g. via a free phone 
number) and have a sufficient number of local outlets. If possible, they should 
employ personnel with good intercultural and communication skills. 
5.2.2  NATURALISATION CAMPAIGNS 
As the data in Chapter 6 show, only a small percentage of immigrants eligible 
for naturalisation actually choose to apply. Reluctance is highest among Union 
citizens who have few additional benefits from acquiring the nationality of an-
other Member State. Even among third country nationals, for whom the incen-
tives are stronger, only a small proportion of potential Union citizens make use 
of the possibility of acquiring this status. One of the reasons for this restraint is 
a lack not only of information but also of public encouragement. Many immi-
grants will not bother to apply if they feel they would not be welcome as new 
citizens. 
Information campaigns help to overcome this deficit. After the reform of 
1999 in Germany, the federal government organised an official naturalisation 
campaign encouraging foreign residents to naturalise. Furthermore, some prov-
inces took specific action. The state government of Hesse ran a campaign tar-
geting children born before January 2000 but not yet older than ten years of 
age who, according to an interim ruling valid until 31 December 2000, could 
acquire German nationality until 31 December 2000. As a result, many more 
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migrant parents took advantage of this opportunity in Hesse than in other prov-
inces. 
Such public campaigns will not merely have a significant impact on the 
number of naturalisations, but will also send important signals to the wider pub-
lic that the authorities regard immigrants as future citizens. This can be a par-
ticularly effective way of combating hostility towards immigrants. Since natural-
isation in a Member State is the only way to acquire Union citizenship after 
birth, European Union (co)funding for such campaigns should be considered a 
matter of course. 
5.2.3  PREPARATORY TRAINING AND TESTING 
As discussed in section 3, most states require some knowledge of the lan-
guage(s) of the country before naturalisation and an increasing number also 
demand knowledge of its institutions and history. Where there are no state-
organised courses for acquiring these skills, transparency and fairness require 
a clear definition of approved courses and diplomas offered by private com-
panies, adult education centres or NGOs. This demand can easily be fulfilled 
with regard to language training, where standardised certificates exist for 
every language and exams can be taken in approved centres. In this case, the 
authorities should make sure that the relevant information and information 
about course providers is easily accessible to potential candidates. As general 
proof of language knowledge, applicants should have the choice of either 
providing a certificate from a registered course or of taking a test or an oral 
interview with the authority in question. Educational certificates that could not 
have been acquired without knowledge of the language at the highest level 
requested (e.g. vocational certificates or degrees from universities obtained in 
the country) should be accepted as proof of language knowledge. For inter-
views with a civil servant, there should be clear criteria, equal implementation 
throughout the country and appropriate training of the officials. 
Not all language training centres and schools cater to the specific needs of 
immigrants and the fees charged are generally rather high. We recommend 
therefore that states should sponsor training courses organised by specialist 
training institutions, organise courses in public schools or support individuals 
through vouchers or tax deductions for attending courses. Providing child care 
facilities during course hours will remove further obstacles. Immigrant NGOs 
should be involved in disseminating information. 
If Member States also decide to introduce societal knowledge tests, these 
should be standardised and cover a clearly defined and publicly accessible 
scope of basic knowledge. For both language and societal knowledge tests, the 
authorities should not prescribe mandatory course attendance, since such 
knowledge may be acquired by different means. 
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5.3  The application procedure 
5.3.1  DURATION OF PROCEDURE 
According to Article 10 of the European Convention on Nationality, ‘each State 
Party shall ensure that applications relating to the acquisition, retention, loss, 
recovery or certification of its nationality are processed within a reasonable 
time.’ Long procedures may indicate that the public authorities are not interest-
ed in immigrant integration. Other reasons include administrative malfunctions, 
backlogs or the number and type of documents to be provided by applicants. 
According to the NGO reports summarised in Chapter 5, the average du-
ration is shorter than 12 months only in Austria, Belgium (for acquisition through 
declaration), Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Delays of up 
to two years and longer are reported in France, Luxembourg, Finland, Italy 
and Spain. The worst practice can be found in Greece, where cases can be put 
on hold for years without giving reasons and may be never decided at all be-
cause naturalisation applications fall outside the scope of the Code of Adminis-
trative Practice and there is thus no maximum duration for the procedure. In 
Denmark, delays are caused by the fact that naturalisations are decided in 
parliament only twice a year. The Netherlands abolished a similar procedure in 
1985, which has led to a considerable acceleration of procedures. A parlia-
mentary procedure may also trigger public debates about specific groups of 
applicants, which provides opportunities for xenophobic campaigns by populist 
parties. Since naturalisation involves decisions on individual cases rather than 
on general laws, we believe it more appropriate that it should be the compe-
tence of the executive rather than the legislative branch of government. We 
therefore suggest that countries where parliament makes decisions on individual 
naturalisations should consider introducing a purely administrative procedure 
instead. The need to provide proof of renunciation of a former nationality can 
also prolong the procedure. Release procedures in the country of origin may 
take several months or years, particularly in countries with a defunct admin-
istration or in countries at war, and can be very costly. The problem could be 
mitigated if, as in Luxembourg, the authorities regard release procedures last-
ing longer than a year for reasons beyond the applicant’s control as proof that 
renunciation of the previous nationality is not possible and consequently grant 
naturalisation without requiring such renunciation. 
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5.3.2  PRINCIPLES OF GOOD ADMINISTRATION 
Good administration is a cornerstone of the rule of law in Europe.22 The right to 
be heard, access to information, assistance and representation, and an indica-
tion of remedies should be consistently applied to naturalisation procedures. In 
particular, applicants shall be given the opportunity to obtain clear information 
about their case at any stage of the procedure and to receive a statement of 
reasons if a decision is made. The administrative process has to be made 
transparent and binding guidelines should guide administrative practice, includ-
ing in the case of discretionary decision-making. In order to provide remedies, 
applicants should be entitled to approach the courts or ombudsman institutions 
in cases of suspected administrative malpractice. A lack of transparency in the 
procedure is a sign of administrative malfunction. 
As pointed out above, Greece provides a negative example, where the 
authorities neither have to inform applicants about the status of their case nor 
give reasons for their decisions. Discrimination against certain third country na-
tionals has been reported in countries other than Greece, where there is a ver-
bal ministerial decree forbidding the naturalisation of Albanian citizens. Long 
waiting periods and complaints about the general behaviour of civil servants 
towards applicants from Muslim and African countries have been reported by 
NGOs counselling in this field, including in Spain and Portugal. In Greece, law-
yers regularly advise Muslim clients to be baptised in order to overcome the 
difficulties. 
Direct or indirect discrimination of this kind violates not only the principle of 
equal treatment of third country nationals, but also the prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on race, ethnic origin, religion and other grounds laid down in 
Art. 13 of the Treaty on the European Community. We propose amending the 
Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between per-
sons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (2000/43 EC) to include the adminis-
trative procedures regulating access to naturalisation within the scope of the 
Directive as defined in Art. 3, para. 1.23 European anti-discrimination standards 
would then also fully comply with the relevant provisions of the International 
Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racism (Art. 1, para. 3). To pre-
vent ethnic and racial discrimination, national antidiscrimination bodies should 
be given the authority to scrutinise naturalisation procedures regularly. Fur-
                                         
22  See Draft European Constitutional Treaty, CONV 850/03, Art. II-41, as well as Council 
of Europe Resolution (77) 31 on the protection of the individual in relation to the acts of 
administrative authorities, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 September 
1977. 
23  Although the Union has no direct competence in matters of nationality, the anti-
discrimination directive covers general administrative procedures. Naturalisation could 
be explicitly mentioned in this context. 
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thermore, staff should be trained in intercultural competence and communica-
tion and employment priority should be given to civil servants with an intercul-
tural background. 
5.3.3  DOCUMENTS REQUESTED 
A long procedure can be further exacerbated by the time needed to collect 
the necessary documents for the application, which may require repeated trav-
el to the country of origin or lengthy correspondence with the authorities there. 
Specific problems occur if the documents requested are unknown in the country 
of origin. Although in this case the law either provides for exceptions or the 
authorities exercise discretion in finding a solution, regional or other differences 
in practice exist in several Member States. There are also instances when it is 
impossible to obtain documents, e.g. in the case of war or defunct state admin-
istration. Most Member States allow these documents to be replaced by other 
kinds of proof, but administrative practices often vary greatly across regions. 
In many Member States, documents have to be translated by publicly certi-
fied translators. Translation costs are a major factor in the overall costs of natu-
ralisation. In order to keep them low, Member States should restrict the number 
of requested documents to the necessary minimum and make use of inter-
authority document transfers whenever possible, without charging the applicant. 
In order to develop a common practice with regard to requested docu-
ments, Member States ought to exchange experiences. In particular, a common 
European list of documents and enhanced cooperation between embassies in 
Member States could improve the processing of applications all over Europe. 
5.3.4  BACKLOGS 
Backlogs have been reported in most countries. These are mainly due to a 
combination of increasing numbers of applications and a lack of personal and 
financial resources for administration. However, harsher security checks of ap-
plicants since the terrorist attacks of 2001 also seem to contribute to backlogs. 
If a lack of resources or personnel is the problem, decentralisation of the 
procedure can speed up the process, as shown by the Netherlands and 
Greece. In Finland, procedural reforms introducing a priority for clearly well-
founded applications and the simultaneous processing of similar cases has 
helped reduce the length of the procedure. We suggest that, where the aver-
age duration is more than a year, the authorities develop targeted pro-
grammes to shorten the procedure by decentralisation, procedural reforms or 
other means. Additionally, a maximum duration of twelve months could be 
fixed by law or in ministerial decrees in order to prevent unreasonable delays 
and to strengthen the position of applicants. 
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5.3.5  FEES AND OTHER COSTS 
Most countries charge fees for naturalisation. Only Belgium, France, Luxem-
bourg and Spain make no charge for general residence-based acquisition. To-
tal costs in other countries range from � 11 stamp duties in Italy to administrative 
fees of � 1,470 in Greece. In Austria, fees in some provinces and certain cases 
may even add up to � 1,878. In many Member States, fees vary with the mode 
of naturalisation, or additional costs apply to a naturalisation test, as in the 
Netherlands and the UK. In Austria and the Netherlands, fees depend on the 
income of the applicant. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, fees are charged not for the acquisition of nationality, but for the ap-
plication – even if it is turned down. This is a particularly effective mechanism 
for screening applicants and deterring those whose success appears doubtful. If 
the naturalisation of the applicant is extended to other family members, the 
total amount of fees and costs may increase even more. Apart from fees, ap-
plicants often incur costs for the issue and translation of documents and of 
stamp duties for documents requested. 
Given the fact that most applicants for naturalisation belong to lower in-
come groups, fees will often be a deterrent to naturalisation, particularly in 
countries where they are set at unreasonably high levels, as in Austria and 
Greece. Since the naturalisation of long-term immigrants is in the interest not 
only of the applicant, but also of the state, the best practice would be to abol-
ish fees for naturalisation altogether. As a minimum standard, we recommend 
that fees should not be higher than those for issuing of a passport. In any case, 
the authorities should consider exempting applicants below a minimum income 
level from all fees. 
5.3.6  OATHS AND CEREMONIES 
Nine countries in our study request the swearing of an oath of loyalty or the 
signature of a comparable declaration when adults acquire nationality. Except 
in Germany, where the declaration contains a long list of pledges, the oaths or 
declaration are short and express loyalty to the state and its legal order. In 
Greece, Italy and Spain this oath has to be sworn within six months or one year 
of the acquisition of nationality, otherwise the decision will be revoked. 
The United Kingdom has recently introduced a mandatory citizenship cere-
mony for naturalisations. Voluntary ceremonies are held in some provinces in 
Austria, e.g. in Vienna. Mandatory ceremonies are also planned in the Nether-
lands, where all naturalisations should take place on ‘naturalisation days’, held 
only twice a year, which will prolong the waiting period. Denmark plans to 
convene a ceremony in parliament to inform new citizens about their rights and 
duties. 
We have no normative objections to a declaration or an oath of loyalty to 
the legal order of the state granting naturalisation. Although native-born citi-
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zens do not have to pledge such allegiance unless they are sworn in for high 
public office, a democracy may require that newcomers who have had previ-
ous commitments to another state should express their loyalty in this particular 
way. The content of such oaths or declarations should, however, be confined to 
respect for the constitution and the legal order. It should include neither re-
nouncing allegiances to other states (since this would implicitly rule out multiple 
nationality) nor a list of values that may support the democratic institutions but 
need not necessarily be shared by all citizens. Citizenship ceremonies serve as 
a symbolic public event and may be recommended if they celebrate the immi-
grants’ achievements and contributions and the society’s diversity and are also 
used to inform the new citizens. They are problematic if they become occasions 
for nationalistic and assimilationist rhetoric. Making participation in such cere-
monies mandatory is at odds with the expression of a genuinely voluntary 
commitment. 
6  Concluding Remarks 
Our evaluations and recommendations are based on a set of principles that 
favour the political inclusion of long-term immigrants and their descendants in 
the political community of receiving societies, while at the same time respecting 
the external ties linking emigrants to their countries of origin. We have argued 
that these principles leave sufficient scope for taking into account relevant state 
interests and for variations in policy regarding nationality and citizenship 
across states, reflecting their particular histories and concerns about specific 
groups of migrants. Membership of the European Union does, however, add 
considerable weight to the call for common minimum standards, mutual adapta-
tion and learning across international borders. Each state’s nationality laws also 
regulate the acquisition and loss of Union citizenship and thereby impact the 
Union as a whole as well as other Member States by opening up or constrain-
ing access to mobility rights within Union territory. 
We are only moderately optimistic that these principles will be adopted 
and fully respected by all Member States. As discussed in Chapter 7, our em-
pirical study shows that the trend towards more liberal nationality laws, which 
has been postulated in much of the comparative literature, is at best uneven 
and may even have been reversed in a number of countries where concerns 
about irregular immigration, abuse of asylum, terrorist threats and social mar-
ginalisation and cultural alienation from the mainstream society among commu-
nities of long-term immigrants have recently prompted restrictions on access to 
denizenship as well as nationality. We believe that these policy developments 
generally exacerbate the problems they are meant to address instead of re-
solving them. They contribute to the marginalisation and alienation of migrant 
populations who will still remain in the country but are excluded from equal 
Bauböck et al.: Acquisition and Loss of Nationality  
 
 
70 
 
rights and full membership. They also send a signal to native populations that 
immigrants are not welcome as future citizens. 
Our moderate optimism is based mainly on two arguments. Firstly, most 
Member States that are currently reluctant to admit immigrants to nationality 
and citizenship will experience sharp declines in their working age populations 
within the next ten years. In response, they may have to reconsider their poli-
cies in order to make their countries more attractive to long-term immigrants. 
Secondly, enlargement of the Union has included new countries whose traditions 
of citizenship and nationality have often been shaped by concerns very differ-
ent from those of the old Member States. In several cases, nationality laws and 
policies directly affect historic minorities with strong cultural and political affini-
ties to neighbouring states. Based on the Copenhagen criteria, minority rights 
and conflicts concerning minorities within and across state borders have al-
ready been an important issue in negotiations concerning accession. They may 
eventually be recognised as a permanent and common concern for the Union. If 
the Union wishes to address these conflicts, it will also need a more coherent set 
of guidelines for the acquisition and loss of nationality both within and outside 
a state territory. We are aware that our comprehensive survey of current laws 
and policies will have to be expanded to include the new Member States and 
accession countries, but we are confident that we have provided an original 
methodology and a solid empirical basis on which future studies and empirical-
ly grounded policy recommendations can build. 
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